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Abstract 
In this dissertation I critically engage with Alex De Waal’s understanding of the nature 
of legitimacy in the Horn of Africa and the concept he formulates to understand it and 
explain political behaviour in the Horn: the political marketplace. Through this 
process of critical engagement, I clarify the concept and make it more useful by 
embedding it within the social and religious realities of the Horn, which results in a 
reconceptualisation of the concept, which I call the political bazaar. This reworked 
concept is then used in conjunction with Talal Asad’s discursive tradition of Sunni 
Islam and Peter Ekeh’s primordial public to more parsimoniously, accurately and 
comprehensively conceptualise legitimacy in the Horn and explain why its pervasive 
political behaviour is bargaining. Ultimately, I attempt to both abide by Raymond 
Geuss’s first thesis: ‘Don’t look at just what they say, think, believe, but at what they 
actually do, and what actually happens as a result’,1 and heed the warning he gives: 
‘It is no sign of gimlet-eyed realism to deny the enormous real significance of religious 
practices, beliefs and institutions in the world, past and present, but rather a sign of 
simple blindness.’2  
                                               
1 Raymond Guess, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 10–
11. 
2 Ibid., 11. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The question of how political legitimacy is understood by the inhabitants of the Horn 
of Africa is an important one and it is commendable that De Waal asks it in The Real 
Politics of The Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power. This question’s 
focus on the inhabitants’ understanding of legitimacy is important, as most questions 
and answers pertaining to political legitimacy in the Horn, in the existing literature, 
leave it out. De Waal’s approach of a political ethnography is what prompts him to 
ask the right question regarding a region that has struggled to achieve and maintain 
political order since the early 1990s.3 Finding out how legitimacy is understood by 
those who reside in the Horn is important, because much of the governance reform 
efforts in the region have been disconnected from the region’s own understandings of 
legitimacy. Most analysts and policy makers in the region focus on building and 
bolstering state institutions such as the legislature, judiciary and executive, while 
simultaneously attempting to convince the local inhabitants of these institutions’ 
legitimacy.4 Asking how the Horn’s inhabitants understand legitimacy is therefore the 
first step towards an understanding of the region that has its own system of governance 
based on its inhabitants’ ideas and understanding of legitimacy. 
I analyse the answer that De Waal gives to his own question and offer an alternative 
explanation to his reasoning. I share De Waal’s understanding that bargaining, or in 
his terms, the buying and selling of power and loyalty, is the predominant political 
behaviour in the Horn. However, the explanation of why this is the case in my work 
differs to that given by De Waal. I argue that historical and anthropological evidence 
shows that bargaining has been, not only the predominant political behaviour, but the 
predominant social action in societies in which Sunni Islam is the dominant discursive 
tradition.5 This is in contrast with De Waal, as his explanation excludes Islam as the dominant	discursive	tradition of the Horn and relies on material change, self-interest 
and monetary values to explain why bargaining is the predominant political behaviour 
                                               
3 See the abundance of literature on the crisis of governance and ‘state failure’ in the Horn post-1990. 
4 Alex De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 2015), 16. 
5 Lawrence Rosen, Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim 
Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Talal Asad, ‘The Idea of an Anthropology 
of Islam,’ Qui Parle 17, no. 2 (2009): 1–30; Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen, 
‘Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou,’ in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in 
Cultural Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123–313. 
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in the Horn. Although,	there	are	many	areas	of	disagreement	between	De	Waal	and	 I,	 the	product	 of	my	 critical	 engagement	with	 the	 concept	 of	 the	political	marketplace	in	the	Horn	-	my	own	explanation	-	undoubtedly	builds	on	his	work. 
The Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Somali, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti (‘the Horn’) is the 
geographical area on which De Waal focuses. His analysis leads him to construct the 
concept of the political marketplace, which he uses to explain political behaviour in 
the region. Given that my work is a conceptual analysis of De Waal’s political 
marketplace, I offer an alternative understanding of this region, in order to analyse 
how clear and useful the political marketplace is in explaining political behaviour 
here. This extensive analysis allows for an assessment of the concept’s potential to 
lead to theorising (i.e. its connections with other concepts) and offers a better 
theoretical analysis of political behaviour in the Horn. De Waal arrived at the concept 
of the political marketplace through his observation that the buying and selling of 
power and loyalty was the most pervasive political behaviour in the Horn. De Waal 
then conceptualised this type of political behaviour as most similar to marketplace 
behaviour. I interpret De Waal to be arguing that the political marketplace is the most 
useful concept to understand political behaviour in the Horn, as he argues that 
legitimacy in the Horn resembles a marketplace. Accordingly, I critically engage with 
this argument and its central concept.  
I begin the process of critical engagement by answering the question of what the 
political marketplace’s strengths and weaknesses are as a concept for understanding 
political behaviour in the Horn. This process begins in the next section with the stating 
of the research question and the defining of several key concepts, and concludes at the 
end of chapter two. Chapter two begins with what other scholars have identified as 
weaknesses and strengths of the political marketplace and concludes with the strengths 
and weaknesses I identify. This chapter also foregrounds the alternative explanation I 
offer, which uses an embedded version of De Waal’s concept in conjunction with 
several other concepts to explain legitimacy and political behaviour in the Horn. 
Chapter three begins this explanation by embedding De Waal’s concept within Sunni 
Islam and its political culture. Chapter four gives an account of how an amended and 
clarified political marketplace might be used in connection with two other concepts to 
generate a more accurate conceptualisation of legitimacy and, accordingly, a more 
grounded theoretical analysis of political behaviour in the Horn. In doing so, I engage 
9		
with De Waal’s claim that the political marketplace is ‘a system of contemporary 
governance’.6 Finally, I conclude in chapter five by reflecting on my critiques of De 
Waal and my own alternative explanation, to make suggestions about how the political 
marketplace might be used going forward and how best to understand legitimacy in 
the Horn of Africa. 
1.1 Research Question and Key Concepts 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of Alex De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace and the marketplace as a form of legitimacy? 
There are two questions contained in the above formulation of the research question. 
The first seeks to critically engage with De Waal’s concept of a political marketplace, 
and assess its strengths and weaknesses as a concept of political science and 
international relations when applied to study legitimacy and political behaviour in the 
Horn. The criteria for assessing the political marketplace will be its clarity, usefulness 
and capability of being used in connection with other concepts to generate theory. The 
second question seeks to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of the marketplace as 
a form of legitimacy or, differently put, as viewing legitimacy in the Horn as 
resembling a marketplace.  
To answer these two questions, I must first clearly define the key concepts that are 
embedded within them. These key concepts are legitimacy and the political 
marketplace. Given that the political marketplace is the subject of my conceptual 
analysis, a clearer definition of it will be offered during the process of my argument. 
The definition given for it here is that given by De Waal and will be critically engaged 
with. The definition of legitimacy will not be critically engaged with, as it is not the 
concept being analysed. Its definition will be given and justified, and then it will be 
applied. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a contextual belief that is synonymous with what is fitting and proper.7 
Accordingly, political legitimacy is present in a society when the dominant way of 
                                               
6 De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 30. 
7 Raymond Guess, Philosophy and Real Politics, 11. 
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exercising power is deemed fitting and proper by those who use it and by those who 
it is used upon.8 Firstly, I have chosen this definition because it interested in whether 
the people of the Horn perceive the political marketplace place as legitimate, not 
whether others outside of the Horn think it is or whether it is in a universal sense. 
Secondly, I have chosen this definition as it emphasises that legitimacy is a belief and, 
thus, that ideas of legitimacy interact with other beliefs and concepts. Thirdly and 
finally, De Waal’s ethnographic approach to understanding governance in the Horn 
implies a very similar understanding of legitimacy, although he does not define 
legitimacy in his book, a fact that does not help the clarity of his concept of the political 
marketplace. 
The Political Marketplace 
According to De Waal, the concept of the political marketplace is defined as ‘a 
contemporary system of governance in which politics is conducted as the exchange of 
political services or loyalty for payment or licence’.9 He asserts that this system of 
governance exists where the following four conditions apply: 
(a) political finance is in the hands of individuals with political, military or 
business interests; (b) control over the instruments of violence is dispersed or 
contested; and (c) political disputes are not resolved by institutional rules and 
procedures (law is subordinate to political contingency). Additionally, (d) these 
countries are integrated into the global political and economic order in a 
subordinate position.10 
In contrast and to define the concept of the marketplace, as used in my argument, the 
marketplace is an institution that facilitates the exchange of goods, commodities, 
services and money.  
In addition to the key concepts embedded in the research question itself, there are three 
other concepts that play a significant role in my critique of De Waal and in the 
formulation of my own explanation. These are concepts are: Talal Asad’s Discursive 
                                               
8 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defence of Anarchism (Berkley: University of California Press, 1970), 1–5. 
9 De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 28. 
10 Ibid., 30. 
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Tradition, Peter Ekeh’s Primordial Public and Epistemic Relativism. I will define them 
in detail below. 
An Islamic Discursive Tradition 
This quote from Asad’s The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam best defines the 
concept of a discursive tradition, 
An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to 
a particular Islamic practice in the present. Clearly, not everything Muslims say 
and do belongs to an Islamic discursive tradition. Nor is an Islamic tradition in 
this sense necessarily imitative of what was done in the past. For even where 
traditional practices appear to the anthropologist to be imitative of what has gone 
before, it will be the practitioners' conceptions of what is apt performance, and 
of how the past is related to present practices, that will be crucial for tradition, 
not the apparent repetition of an old form.11 (emphasis added) 
The Primordial Public I	will also use a quote to define the primordial public, as I did the concept of a 
discursive tradition above, given that these concepts were formulated by Asad and 
Ekeh respectively. In defining the primordial public Ekeh writes the following: 
At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties and 
sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour. I shall call 
this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial 
groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge on the public 
interest.12  
This quote needs to be supplemented with another of Ekeh’s statements about the 
primordial public from the same piece of work, however, to complete the definition 
of the primordial public: 
Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the 
one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to 
which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial 
                                               
11 Talal Asad, ‘ The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,’ Qui Parle 17, no. 2 (2009): 21. 
12 Peter P. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,’ Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): 92. 
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public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are 
expected to give generously and do give materially. Their relationship to the 
primordial public is moral, while their relationship with the civic public is 
amoral.13 
Epistemic Relativism  
Epistemic Relativism is a concept that emphasises the importance of context in 
relation to knowledge and knowing. This epistemological position is best defined by 
Collier:  
[…] the view that knowledge (and/or truth or justification) is relative – to time, 
to place, to society, to culture, to historical epoch, to conceptual scheme or 
framework, or to personal training or conviction – in that what counts as 
knowledge (or as true or justified) depends upon the value of one or more of 
these variables.14 
Epistemological relativism does not argue, however, that you cannot come to know or 
create a new concept over time by building on and refining old concepts, just that the 
majority of human understanding occurs through the use of already known and 
familiar concepts.15 
1.2 Research Background 
Alex de Waal’s concept of the political marketplace first appears as a complete 
conceptual framework in The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the 
Business of Power, which was published in 2015. The context in which De Waal wrote 
this book and the purpose of its main argument – that legitimacy resembles a 
marketplace in the Horn – is important, as it helps understand the concept as well as 
the relevance of my work. The context of De Waal’s book is the re-thinking of 
governance and legitimacy, given the continued failure of the state-centric model of 
                                               
13 Peter P. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,’ Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): 100. 
14 Harvey Siegel, ‘Epistemological Relativism: Arguments Pro and Con,’ in A Companion to 
Relativism, ed. Steven D. Hales (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 201–218. 
15 Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (London & New 
York: Verso, 1994), 90, 241. 
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governance in the Horn. De Waal writes to respond to this phenomenon and to offer 
his own account of the nature of governance and legitimacy in the Horn. He first 
explains why the state model is failing and then moves on to conceptualise what he 
thinks is the contemporary system of governance in the Horn, the political 
marketplace. He uses his concept of the political marketplace to argue that, rather than 
flogging the dead horse of the state model of governance, governance practitioners 
and theorists should acknowledge the political marketplace as a contemporary system 
of governance and seek to work within it and transform it.  
The primary audience of De Waal’s political marketplace is academics and analysts 
of the Horn who adhere to authoritarian high modernism, particularly those who apply 
it to answer questions around political order, governance and legitimacy in the Horn.16 
This theory of governance argues that in order for legitimate governance to become a 
reality in the Horn, formal and modern state institutions need to increase in their 
efficiency, effectiveness and number.17 Furthermore, although his audience 
acknowledges that the application of this theory has not worked in the past, they 
maintain that it will in time. Understanding this audience helps one place De Waal’s 
research and the concept of the political marketplace.  
De Waal’s concept of the political marketplace and the ‘dollarisation’ of politics have 
considerable explanatory power in a globalised world with an abundance of 
transnational actors and security patronage networks. Although conceptualising 
legitimacy as resembling a marketplace in the Horn has its strengths, it also has 
weaknesses; I aim to elucidate both as I analyse the concept of the political 
marketplace. My argument places the concept of the political marketplace in the 
literature that deals with the ideas of state failure, predatory states, neopatrimonialism, 
hybrid governance structures and so on.  
                                               
16 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (Princeton: Yale University Press, 1998). 
17 C. Young, ‘Zaïre: The Shattered Illusion of the Integral State,’ The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 32, no. 2 (1994): 247–263. 
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1.3 Relevance of the Research Question 
The conceptual analysis of the political marketplace and the way it understands 
legitimacy in the Horn is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, there is currently no 
conceptual analysis of the political marketplace and, given the relative influence it has 
had in explaining political behaviour in the Horn, it needs to be systematically 
analysed. Secondly, the understanding of political legitimacy that is implicitly put 
forward deviates significantly from the understandings of legitimacy that have hitherto 
dominated in political science, which are centred around formalised state institutions. 
Thus, further analysis and clarification of this concept – and the second-order question 
of whether the political marketplace’s understanding of legitimacy is tenable and 
accurately describes the nature of legitimacy as perceived by those in the Horn – is 
relevant. This is especially true in the context of the Horn, given the many recorded 
and unrecorded failures of incremental state-building in the Horn and the belief among 
most of those involved in state-building initiatives that a legitimate monopoly on 
violence is a necessary condition for political order. De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace challenges this theory and argues that a system of governance already 
exists in the Horn. Further investigation and analysis of the political marketplace is 
relevant, because if De Waal is correct and the political marketplace and its 
understanding of legitimacy in the Horn best describes political behaviour within it, 
then this concept has deep implications for how political scientists interpret political 
behaviour in the Horn and how scholars of the Horn understand legitimacy.  
1.4 Thesis 
De Waal operates on two levels: ideas and their empirical manifestations. 
Accordingly, De Waal argues that, in the Horn, legitimacy resembles a marketplace 
and that this idea empirically manifests itself in the pervasive political behaviour of 
the buying and selling of power and loyalty. I, however, argue that marketplaces are 
always socially embedded in different political cultures and, thus, the notion that 
legitimacy resembles a marketplace is unclear given that there are different 
conceptualisations of the marketplace. Accordingly, before legitimacy is understood 
as a marketplace, De Waal needs to define which species of marketplace he is referring 
to and what primarily informs how it is conceptualised. I show that there is at least 
one other conceptualisation of the marketplace that needs to be considered if the 
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concept of the political marketplace is to be applied as a way of understanding 
legitimacy in the Horn. This alternative conceptualisation is the bazaar or souk. 
Accordingly, my work aims to: 
o more clearly define a political marketplace 
o identify a different conception of a political marketplace 
o show that this different conception is closely related to the surrounding 
political culture, especially the religious dimension of political culture 
o develop its own explanation of how legitimacy is understood by those 
in the Horn and why bargaining is the predominant political behaviour 
in the Horn. 
I achieve the above through a conceptual analysis of De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace. I use the religious dimension of political culture as the base for this 
analysis and show that there are different expressions of the marketplace according to 
which political culture it is embedded within, very similar to single genes having 
different species. My argument shows this by surveying how the marketplace is 
conceptualised differently within the Islamic political culture of Sunni Islam. As will 
be evident, I focus on the religious component of political culture and particularly on 
Sunni Islam. This focus was chosen as Sunni Islam is the predominant religious 
dimension of Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea’s political culture and is also present in 
Ethiopia’s (although it is not dominant, approximately 33% of Ethiopians identify as 
Muslim).18 I describe and analyse Sunni Islam’s conceptualisation of the marketplace 
(the souk or bazaar), and then show how legitimacy in the Horn more closely 
resembles a bazaar than a generic marketplace. Once this is completed, my argument 
uses the concept of the political bazaar in conjunction with Sunni Islam and the 
primordial public to create my own conceptualisation of legitimacy in the Horn, which 
more parsimoniously and accurately explains why bargaining is the pervasive political 
behaviour of the Horn. 
I use Haggai Erlich’s understanding of the history of the Horn, which is that legitimacy 
and political behaviour in the Horn have been predominantly determined by concepts 
                                               
18 Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, ‘World Profiles,’ accessed September 8, 2017, 
http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries. 
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embedded in Islam and Christianity, and the concept of pragmatism.19 It is evident 
from this that De Waal and I are in agreement about the pervasiveness of pragmatism 
in Horn politics, but my analysis differs from De Waal’s significantly. I argue that in 
order to accurately understand the nature of legitimacy, an analyst must also look to 
people’s metaphysical beliefs enshrined in the dominant discursive tradition of a 
society, as they are the root of people’s beliefs around power and its use (legitimacy). 
I therefore argue that at this period in the Horn’s history, Sunni Islam primarily 
informs how legitimacy is conceptualised and understood by those in the Horn. This 
does not make the concept of the political marketplace irrelevant, however; it merely 
means that the analyst must look to the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam to derive 
the rules and norms of the marketplace and reconceptualise it as the political bazaar. 
Additionally, I argue that the primordial public is also a source of legitimacy and that 
in the Horn the right to legitimate is bargained over by Sunni Islam, the political bazaar 
and the primordial public, with Sunni Islam having the most bargaining power at this 
point in time.20 The differences between our theses may be made clearer in the 
following way: 
De Waal 
(Legitimacy/marketplace) à political behaviour 
Capon 
Religion à legitimacy and conceptions of the marketplace à political behaviour  
 
		
                                               
19 Haggai Erlich, Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 1–11. 
20 This work maintains that Sunni Islam’s influence is subject to a dynamic of ebb and flow, but that 
since the 1990s, it has predominately informed how legitimacy is understood. Ibid., 154. 
17		
Chapter 2: Existing and New Critiques of Alex de Waal’s 
Political Marketplace 
Harry Verhoeven and Gérard Prunier have written the most thorough and insightful 
reviews of De Waal’s The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the 
Business of Power. They both point to the way in which De Waal’s materialist, 
rationalist and political-realist assumptions cause him to over-determine the role of 
commercial or business logic and money in explaining political behaviour in the Horn. 
Both reviews are short, numbering between three and four pages in length, however, 
and so cannot fully respond to and analyse De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace. As a result, they do not fully engage with De Waal’s deeper argument 
that legitimacy resembles a marketplace in the Horn. This chapter gives an account of 
De Waal’s argument and the concept of the political marketplace, as well as existing 
and new criticisms thereof. When formulating my criticisms and foregrounding my 
own explanation, reference will be made to De Waal’s major intellectual influences. 
This is partly because his analysis is clearly traceable to their work; he explicitly 
references them. More importantly, I use more accurate interpretations of the work of 
De Waal’s intellectual influences to construct an alternative explanation for why the 
predominant political behaviour in the Horn is bargaining.  
2.1 De Waal’s Political Marketplace  
This section offers a more substantial explanation of De Waal’s definition of the 
political marketplace given briefly in the previous chapter. This is made possible by 
referring to his own responses to reviews of his work. This exposition of his argument 
and his consequent clarifications of the political marketplace are important to 
understand before listing and assessing others’ critiques of his work and before 
formulating my own new critiques.  
The essence of De Waal’s argument is that political legitimacy in the Horn resembles 
a marketplace. This leads him to conclude that, given that people’s understandings of 
what is politically legitimate is what primarily informs their political behaviour, 
political behaviour in the Horn most resembles marketplace behaviour and its cost-
benefit analysis/utility-maximising behaviour. For De Waal, power and loyalty are 
bought and sold in the Horn for purposes predominantly related to rational self-interest 
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and the accumulation of money. De Waal then moves on to the empirical plain and 
gives the four material conditions that must be present for a political marketplace-
based system of governance to exist (given in the definition in the previous chapter). 
Once De Waal has moved out of the abstract into the empirical, we see that he commits 
to the marketplace not just as metaphor for explaining political behaviour in the Horn, 
but for the way politics is practised.21 Although he is clear about the commercial logic 
that dominates the political marketplace – ‘The political marketplace is a materialist, 
instrumental framework that provides little space for ideals and norms. Its values are 
monetary’22 – in a response to a critique labelling this analysis reductionist, he says:  
It is important to emphasize that the thesis of the political marketplace does not 
require that all politicians are enslaved to material incentives. Rather, it is a 
hypothesis that political projects are subject to the laws of the political market: 
They survive or fail on the basis of its iron logic.23 
This quote is understood in the context of De Waal’s distinction between political 
circuitry and the public sphere. De Waal argues that political circuitry is where 
political business is transacted and the public sphere is where public debate is 
conducted.24 This distinction, which separates political behaviour into two spheres, 
best explains how De Waal perceives the role of ideology, ethics and morality in the 
politics of the Horn. Accordingly, De Waal understands the buying and selling of 
power and loyalty to be the pervasive political behaviour in the Horn, and ideology, 
ethics, morality and religion to be either instrumentalised or mere rhetoric in public 
debate. According to De Waal, they hardly ever determine political behaviour in the 
Horn. Although De Waal argues this, he does not argue that those who engage in the 
political marketplace and have the necessary skills to navigate it cannot bend these 
same skills to ethical, religious, moral or ideological ends.25 Rather, for De Waal, to 
be politically successful in the Horn, one’s political behaviour must be primarily 
                                               
21 ‘The dominant, and growing, system that orders their behaviour is what I call the ‘political 
marketplace’. For the region's political entrepreneurs and business managers, this is not a metaphor. 
They actually exchange services and rewards, loyalty and money, for prices that are set by the 
elementary principles of supply and demand, and also influenced by whoever is able to regulate the 
market.’ De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 16. 
22 Ibid., 187. 
23 Alex De Waal, ‘Critical Dialogue: The Horn of Africa,’ Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 3 (2017): 
813–814. 
24 De Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 187. 
25 De Waal, ‘Critical Dialogue ,’ 813–814. 
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commercial in nature and stem from an understanding that political dynamics are most 
akin to marketplace dynamics. 
2.2 Existing Critiques of the Political Marketplace  
Prunier criticises the way in which De Waal dismisses the role of culture in explaining 
political behaviour in the Horn, and argues that instead of giving a specialist’s analysis 
of the region which acknowledges its complexity and the multi-casual nature of its 
politics, he commits the mono-causal fallacy by asserting that the ‘real’ determinant 
of political behaviour in the Horn is money.26 Prunier does, however, continue to argue 
that although the ‘real’ politics of the Horn of Africa are the political marketplace, it 
is not inhabited by pure incarnations of homo economicus, as De Waal would have us 
believe.27 He then goes on to name just a few of the various ethnic groups and cultures 
that reside in the Horn to make the point that it is these people who make up the 
political marketplace and it is their cultures that determine the way in which they 
conceptualise the political marketplace and their decision-making, motivations and 
actions within it. Thus, Prunier asserts that another important determinant of political 
behaviour in the Horn, among others, is culture. Prunier also comments extensively 
on the relationship that De Waal had with the late Meles Zenawi (former Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia). He infers from the nature of this relationship that De Waal was 
a disciple of Zenawi and his simplified Marxism, and that he saw in Zenawi and his 
imperative of avoiding a rentier state the key to understanding the politics of the Horn 
and the reason for the endemic ‘failure’ of the state in the region. What Prunier is 
implying with this criticism is that although rents are an important feature of the 
political economy of the Horn, they are not as important in understanding political 
behaviour in the Horn as De Waal’s arguments and concept of the political 
marketplace assert. 
Prunier’s review of De Waal’s The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War 
and The Business of Power is ruthless in its critique of several of De Waal’s major 
arguments. However, it does acknowledge the central role the concept of the political 
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Power,’ Journal of the Middle East & Africa 7, no. 2 (April 2016): 235–238. 
27 Ibid., 237. 
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marketplace plays in explaining the politics of the Horn.28 Prunier’s proceeding 
qualifying statement, however, is extremely important and is what I attempt to respond 
to in many ways. Prunier’s assertions that the political marketplace is inhabited by 
Nuer, Amhara and Oromo, and Dinka groups, among others, is important as it 
highlights that although the political marketplace is central to understanding political 
action in the Horn, its ‘rules around bargaining and the flows of information’29 are 
subject to the locality and culture in which that particular marketplace exists. Or, if 
the marketplace spans different localities, how those localities, identities and political 
cultures interact to shape the dynamics of a broader regional political marketplace. 
Prunier’s acknowledgement of the usefulness of the concept of the political 
marketplace is important, as his review tempts one to ‘throw the baby out with the 
bath water’ with regards to the political marketplace’s usefulness as a concept in 
explaining political behaviour in the Horn. 
Verhoeven’s review is much the same as Prunier’s, except that he explicitly mentions 
the four authors and works that influenced De Waal’s analysis of the Horn and his 
conceptualisation of the political marketplace. Although I had already done this in my 
own research and analysis of De Waal and the political marketplace, it is reassuring 
to have another scholar confirm the same major influences that my work did, barring 
Meles Zenawi and François Bayart. The authors that significantly influenced De Waal 
are Raymond Geuss, Mary Kaldor, Robert Bates, Douglas North and François Bayart. 
Discussing some of these authors and their influences on De Waal will be instructive, 
as my work develops its own critiques of De Waal’s political marketplace and I 
foreground my own conceptualisation of legitimacy and my explanation of political 
behaviour in the Horn. 
2.3 De Waal’s Influences, My Critique and Foregrounding My 
Explanation 
This section begins with Geuss, as his work, Philosophy and Real Politics, forms the 
philosophical foundation for De Waal’s analysis of Horn politics, which according to 
De Waal are predominantly a-ethical. Geuss employs a Critical Realist methodology 
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and adheres to the school of Philosophical Political Realism.30 His influence on 
De Waal is made evident by their shared critique of the fixation that many political 
philosophers have with ethics. This notion, contained in Geuss’ first thesis, is 
instructive: ‘Don’t look at just what they say, think, believe, but at what they actually 
do, and what actually happens as a result’31 (emphasis added). This statement, which 
refers to politics and how to best understand political behaviour, heavily informs the 
initial questions De Waal asks in his analysis of Horn politics and, accordingly, the 
concept he uses to answer these questions: the political marketplace. As I assert, the 
political marketplace is central to explaining political behaviour in the Horn, but De 
Waal forgets that Geuss also writes this: ‘It is no sign of gimlet-eyed realism to deny 
the enormous and real significance of religious practices, beliefs and institutions in the 
world, past and present, but rather a sign of simple blindness.’32 My argument seeks 
to emphasise two statements equally, while navigating the tension that exists between 
them. It is De Waal’s failure to acknowledge the influence of Sunni Islam on the ‘rules 
for bargaining and flows of information’ of the marketplace that weakens his analysis 
and the usefulness of his concept. Herein lies the major critique my work offers of 
De Waal’s work: he fails to acknowledge that what predominantly determines the 
rules and values of a marketplace, and societies’ political cultures, as well as what is 
deemed legitimate political behaviour more broadly, is the dominant discursive 
tradition of a society: Sunni Islam, in the case of the Horn. This will be clarified in the 
next paragraph, which further explores Geuss’s political philosophy and 
epistemology.  
If De Waal’s reading of Geuss were more thorough, he would know that Geuss 
strongly emphasises the importance of context and history when attempting to explain 
the political behaviour of people. Reading Geuss more closely and more broadly and 
delving deeper into his emphasis on context in relation to knowledge and knowing, it 
is clear that he adheres to Epistemic Relativism. This epistemological position is:  
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ontological realism, epistemic relativism, judgmental rationality, and a cautious ethical naturalism.’ 
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31 Guess, Raymond, Philosophy and Real Politics, Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp, 10-–11. 
32 Ibid., 11. 
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[…] the view that knowledge (and/or truth or justification) is relative – to time, 
to place, to society, to culture, to historical epoch, to conceptual scheme or 
framework, or to personal training or conviction – in that what counts as 
knowledge (or as true or justified) depends upon the value of one or more of 
these variables.33 
Epistemological relativism does not argue, however, that you cannot come to know or 
create a new concept over time by building on and refining old concepts, just that the 
majority of human understanding occurs through the use of already known and 
familiar concepts.34 This position is important because, had De Waal adopted it, he 
would have acknowledged the importance of embedding his concept of the political 
marketplace in the Horn and its inhabitants’ religious heritages that inform their 
conceptual reservoirs. This embedding would have enabled De Waal to see that his 
political entrepreneurs most likely draw on and adapt concepts that they already know 
to inform their political behaviour, and that in the Horn these concepts are most likely 
from the conceptual reservoirs of Sunni Islam and Christianity – more so from Sunni 
Islam than from Christianity, given its dominance in the region. The consequences of 
failing to recognise the importance of religion in explaining political behaviour and in 
determining the rules and values of the ‘marketplace’ are more drastic when it is noted 
that religious ways of ordering power are re-emerging and regaining legitimacy in the 
region.35 Adopting this understanding of how the majority of human understanding 
occurs is important, as it provides the framework in which I develop the causal chain 
of my argument regarding how Islam (understood as a discursive tradition) and the 
concepts housed within it significantly influence political behaviour in the Horn by 
establishing with vitality what is and is not deemed legitimate political behaviour.  
This chapter has discussed Geuss’s work, his influence on De Waal and how my work 
uses Epistemic Relativism to argue that it is primarily the dominant discursive 
tradition of Sunni Islam and its conceptual reservoir that determines the rules that 
govern ‘the marketplace’ and what legitimate political behaviour is. This section now 
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York: Verso, 1994), 90, 241. 
35 Erlich, Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa, 193. 
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turns to discuss two more of De Waal’s intellectual influences: Kaldor and Bayart. In 
analysing their work and influence, I develop two further critiques of De Waal’s work. 
Mary Kaldor’s third edition of New and Old Wars influenced De Waal, as suggested 
by Verhoeven, specifically her thesis about ‘new wars’ being largely criminal in nature 
and not a battle of wills in which the war is fought with the aim of victory or the 
restructuring of a society.36 Rather, the state of insecurity is favoured and often times 
created by the participants, as it allows them to profit and, in a limited sense, to 
consolidate their power.37 Adopting Kaldor’s thesis on the shift in the nature and 
agenda of wars allows De Waal to conceptualise a new form of organised violence, 
albeit informally organised, that he names the political marketplace. Kaldor’s work is 
important in understanding De Waal’s dismissal of the influence that ideology has in 
determining political behaviour in the Horn.  
This understanding of violence as primarily criminal in nature and devoid of any social 
purpose does not begin with Kaldor, however, and can be traced back to scholars of 
G.W.F. Hegel’s work on the nature of violence in Africa and its ‘absent’ history.38 
This view on Africa’s history and the nature of its violence is in contrast with Bayart’s 
emphasis on the historicity of Africa and its ability to explain much of the variegated 
political behaviour throughout the continent.39 This section focuses on the tension 
between these two influences, as instead of navigating this tension, De Waal adopts 
Kaldor’s position on the criminal nature of violence in the Horn and negates the 
influence the history of the region has in determining why its current pervasive 
political behaviour is the buying and selling of power and loyalty. This decision to 
embrace Kaldor’s thesis on ‘new wars’ leads De Waal to overlook how important the 
region’s history of ideological and religious struggles have been – and continue to be 
– in determining its inhabitant’s understanding of legitimacy and their political 
behaviour. Thus, my two additional criticisms of De Waal’s work are, firstly, that he 
is too dismissive of the role that ideology, mediated by pragmatism, has in determining 
political behaviour in the Horn. Secondly, under-girthing this critique, he does not 
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appreciate the historicity of the region and how local histories influence people’s 
conceptual reservoirs, their understanding of legitimacy and consequently their 
political behaviour.40  
I do not argue that religion is as influential in determining political behaviour in the 
Horn as it has been in other periods of its history, but that it is the most influential at 
this current time. I argue that Sunni Islam’s conceptual reservoir, which is housed in 
people minds – especially those concepts pertaining to political power, social order 
and the marketplace – predominantly determines political behaviour in the Horn 
today, as it has significant legitimacy. A quote from Erlich’s concluding chapter 
explains, in part, why it currently enjoys the most legitimacy in the Horn: 
Since their first encounter, Islam and Christianity have shaped identities and 
histories in the Horn of Africa. Closer to our time, movements of modern 
nationalism and ideas of social revolution have attempted to replace religiosity 
as new and comprehensive ideologies for Ethiopians, Sudanese and Somalis. 
From today’s perspective it seems they have failed; the secularist and materialist 
approaches barely proved helpful. Parliamentarian Liberalism in Sudan and 
Somali were short-lived; revolutionary pan-Arabism fared no better. Marxist 
experiments similarly failed in Sudan and in Somalia, and were a total disaster 
in Ethiopia […]. The return since the 1990’s, of religious concepts as active 
factors in the dynamisms of politics, culture and self-identification of the 
peoples involved is perhaps more compatible with local histories. […] it is safe 
to assume that in the coming years, Ethiopians, Sudanese and Somalis will 
continue to be inspired by their Christianity and their Islam; that they will meet 
and address their agendas, guided, among others, by the conceptual reservoirs 
of their religious heritages.41 (emphasis added) 
De Waal need not and should not overlook the above, given the specialist knowledge 
he has of the region and the appreciation he has for Bayart’s seminal work The State 
in Africa: A Politics of The Belly and its emphasis on the historicity of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) in explaining its political behaviour. It appears that De Waal interpreted 
Bayart to be arguing that power exists primarily outside of state institutions in the 
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Horn and that, as result, it is concentrated in the hands of ‘Big men’, whereas Bayart 
argues something more nuanced. Bayart argues that power in the Horn is relational in 
nature as opposed to institutional.42 This interpretation would also be more congruent 
with the governmentality that Bayart uses to understand the nature of power in the 
Horn. Michel Foucault contrasts governmentality with institutional power in the 
following way: 
While the theory of political power as an institution ordinarily refers to a 
juridical conception of the law, it seems to me that the analysis of 
governmentality – that is, the analysis of power as a group of reversible 
relations – must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by relation of self to 
self.43 (emphasis my own) 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality reminds us that power exists within and 
between people, that it is their personal relationships and their network of relationships 
that act as conduits for power and its accumulation, loss and application.44 Given that 
formal state institutions in the Horn have little power to enforce their norms or ethics 
and the history of the region, this understanding of power is necessary to understand 
political behaviour in the Horn. De Waal understands Bayart’s point about the 
majority of power existing outside of formal institutions in the Horn, prompting him 
to form the concept of the political marketplace. However, he strays from Bayart’s 
position by mistakenly identifying money as the primary source of power and ultimate 
goal of those participating in the political marketplace. In contrast, I argue that an 
extensive and personalised network of interdependent interrelations is the means by 
which people come into power and that the end which this process of network building 
serves is the creation of social and political order, and the power and status this affords 
an individual in a society in which the dominant discursive tradition is Sunni Islam.  
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2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has served as a literature review that contains an exposition and 
elucidation of De Waal’s work and concept of the political marketplace, and responses 
to and criticisms of it. It has also included a further exploration and critique of his 
ideas through his major intellectual influences. This particular process also served to 
foreground my own argument and explanation for why bargaining is the dominant 
political behaviour in the Horn.  
Before moving on, it is important to summarise the strengths and weaknesses of 
De Waal’s political marketplace and its underlying reasoning, and to explain how the 
following two chapters will address these and develop the concept further by using 
my own alternative explanation (briefly described in this chapter). In short, I have 
argued that although De Waal’s rationalist methodology has enabled him to create the 
concept of the political marketplace, which has significant explanatory power, the 
same methodology also over-emphasises the role that money has in determining 
political behaviour, which limits the concept’s usefulness. I respond to this 
shortcoming of De Waal’s conceptualisation of the political marketplace by 
embedding it in the norms, principles and values of the dominant discursive tradition 
in the Horn, Sunni Islam. This is done to make the concept more useful and show that 
the concept, once embedded, is applicable in any country in which the dominant 
discursive tradition is Sunni Islam.  
To conclude this chapter and with its contents in mind, I offer a cumulative critique of 
De Waal’s political marketplace. De Waal does not give a definition of legitimacy in 
his book, which at its core deals with the issue of how legitimacy is perceived in the 
Horn and how this determines or explains the region’s pervasive political behaviour. 
Although De Waal goes on to characterise political legitimacy as a marketplace, which 
is the central thesis of his book, he does not define what he means by legitimacy. The 
lack of a clear definition of legitimacy significantly weakens his analysis and concept, 
because it disables De Waal from understanding that the Horn’s inhabitants primarily 
understand legitimacy through the concepts that they are already familiar with, most 
of which are from the conceptual reservoir of Sunni Islam. This leads De Waal to 
make the erroneous conclusion that it is the utility-maximising logic of the 
marketplace, its corresponding commodification of the human and its ultimate goal of 
the accumulation of money that best explain why the predominant political behaviour 
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in the Horn is bargaining. I will build on what I have already argued in the next two 
chapters to show why this is not the best explanation for why the most pervasive 
political behaviour in the Horn is bargaining.  
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Chapter 3: Sunni Islam’s Political Culture and Bargaining 
as its Dominant Political Behaviour 
This chapter presents anthropological evidence from Rosen and Geertz’s works, and 
historical evidence from Erlich’s work, to explain why bargaining is the most 
legitimate political behaviour in societies where Sunni Islam is dominant and, 
following on from this, why the pervasive contemporary political behaviour in the 
Horn is bargaining. I conceptualise Sunni Islam as a discursive tradition as defined by 
Talal Asad: 
An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to 
a particular Islamic practice in the present. Clearly, not everything Muslims say 
and do belongs to an Islamic discursive tradition. Nor is an Islamic tradition in 
this sense necessarily imitative of what was done in the past. For even where 
traditional practices appear to the anthropologist to be imitative of what has gone 
before, it will be the practitioners' conceptions of what is apt performance, and 
of how the past is related to present practices, that will be crucial for tradition, 
not the apparent repetition of an old form.45 (emphasis added) 
My argument supplements this evidence and the identified scholars’ arguments and 
concepts, as well as those mentioned in chapter two, with the work of Mittelstaedt, 
Ellis and Polanyi to formulate my own explanation for why bargaining is the most 
pervasive political behaviour in the Horn today. 
Before moving on, it is important as part of the introduction to this chapter to 
historically contextualise religion in the Horn, to understand why it is so influential in 
the contemporary politics of this region. The reason I include Ellis and Erlich’s works 
in my explanation is because their arguments do this very well. I agree with Ellis and 
Te Haar’s claim that the recent revival of public religion in the Horn is connected to 
the failure of formal state institutions and apparatuses, and I remind the reader that 
this observation is also made by Erlich in the quote used in chapter two.46 Additionally, 
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Ellis’s work implies that given the failure of formal state institutions and apparatuses 
in the Horn over the last three decades, religious ways of ordering power are being 
and have been perceived as alternative governance structures.47 Ellis and Erlich’s 
works largely undermine De Waal’s understanding of legitimacy in the Horn as 
resembling a marketplace and being most influenced by commercial principles, 
marketplace logic and monetary values. I, however, seek to embed De Waal’s 
marketplace so that the evidence presented in Ellis and Erlich’s works does not 
completely undermine De Waal’s thesis.  
My explanation, as will be fleshed out in the rest of this chapter, is that bargaining is 
perceived as the most legitimate political behaviour because it serves a social and 
political purpose within the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam: to re-establish and 
maintain social cohesion and political order.48 It is because of this social and political 
behaviour’s legitimacy (which is connected to its widely understood and desirable 
social purpose, and its presence in the conceptual reservoir of Sunni Islam) that 
bargaining is the most pervasive political behaviour in the Horn. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this chapter is to show that if De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace is to be accurate and useful, it must acknowledge that Sunni Islam’s 
concepts pertaining to legitimacy currently inform most people’s understandings of 
what is and is not legitimate political behaviour in the Horn. Related to, but separate 
from, this, De Waal must acknowledge that given this position of Sunni Islam in the 
Horn, its conceptual reservoir also determines how its inhabitants conceptualise 
marketplaces and what they think of when they think of marketplace behaviour.  
The most well-known work on the considerable influence that religious discursive 
traditions have on marketplace conceptualisations and the behaviour of humans within 
the marketplace is Max Weber’s book The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of 
Capitalism. Although his work focuses on Protestantism, I use his methodology to 
argue more generally about the influence of discursive tradition on marketplace 
conceptualisations, and motivations for action both in and outside the marketplace. I 
adopt Weber’s theory of action as its emphasis on motivation allows it to investigate 
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the influence of religiosity on human’s motivations for action, and not just on their 
decision-making. Weber’s definition of motive is: ‘motive is a complex of subjective 
meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for 
the conduct in question.’49 The essence of Weber’s thesis is ‘that particular 
psychological motivations [are] derived from religious beliefs’.50 This approach to 
understanding human action in the Horn is necessary, given the significant role that 
religion plays in public and private life in the region. It also allows me to go beyond 
understanding religion’s role in Horn politics merely as a value system that informs 
the interests that rational actors seek to maximise and realise. In so doing, my approach 
goes beyond the reductionist nature of the rationalist methodology applied by De Waal 
in his analysis of the role of religion in Horn politics. The rationalist methodology 
seeks to infer from an agent’s behaviour what his rational interests might have been 
for acting in such a way (a Behaviouralist understanding). Weber’s theory of human 
action, in contrast, argues that there are four different motivations for action 
(traditional, emotional, idealistic and rational) and acknowledges that there can be 
different motivations for the same behaviour and that not all human behaviour can be 
rationalised. This methodology enables me to argue that De Waal’s conceptualisation 
of the political marketplace and what determines human behaviour within it does not 
allow him to see that there can be different motivations for the same behaviour, and 
thus he over-determines the role that rational-material motivations for action have in 
determining political behaviour in the Horn. Some motivations for action stem from 
relevant and corresponding religious beliefs which are rooted in the metaphysical 
beliefs of a discursive tradition and, therefore, what motivates an actor differ according 
to which religion is dominant in their society and informs their political culture. De 
Waal’s rationalist methodology does not acknowledge this, which means that De Waal 
cannot see two important aspects of human action. Firstly, he cannot acknowledge that 
all human action is not the result of a decision to act and, secondly, he cannot 
acknowledge that discursive traditions do not just influence the content of human 
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rationality – they also influence the way humans think about their actions and give 
meaning to them, as well as their psychological motivations. 
Thus, in line with Weber and in the spirit of Karl Polanyi, I argue that marketplace 
conceptualisations (their dominant behaviour, values and logic) are inseparable from 
the dominant behaviour, values and logic of the dominant discursive tradition of the 
society from which they emerge. It is important to expand upon this, as I do not argue 
that the marketplace is not a place in which individuals’ motivation for action is the 
maximisation of their self-interest; rather, I argue that it is one of three motivations for 
action in the bazaar. Referring to Weber’s four different motivations for action, I argue 
that the traditional, rational, emotional and idealistic motivations for action are often 
derived from the dominant discursive tradition of the society in which the agent is 
embedded. In the case of the Horn, the dominant discursive traditions are religious, 
either Sunni Islam or Christianity: 96.2% of those residing in the Horn identify as 
religious.51 This chapter and my work will focus on how Sunni Islam affects political 
behaviour and marketplace conceptualisations, as the discursive tradition of Sunni 
Islam is dominant in four out of the five countries in the Horn. 
3.1 Sunni Islam and the Bazaar 
De Waal’s analysis is centred on Sudan and Somalia and the political dynamics he 
observed while working there. Although he did spend significant amounts of time in 
the other countries in the Horn, Ethiopia and Eritrea, he makes no mention of Djibouti 
and the empirical evidence he references is mostly gathered from Sudan, Somalia and 
Ethiopia. Sudan is dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, with 
approximately 90% of its population identifying as Sunni Muslims; Somalia is similar 
with 99% of its population identifying as members of Sunni Islam. In Eritrea, 50% of 
the population identifies as Sunni Islam and, in Djibouti, 94% of its population 
identifies as Sunni Islam.52 It is important to acknowledge these statistics as they 
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represent how dominant Sunni Islam is in these Horn countries and why I have chosen 
to focus on De Waal’s references to and analysis of Sudan and Somalia.  
The focus on Sudan and Somalia is significant because it is primarily De Waal’s 
political ethnography of Sudan and Somalia that informs how he understands the 
power dynamics of these counties, and prompts him to formulate the concept of the 
political marketplace.53 I draw attention to this, as when it is noted that there is more 
than one way of conceptualising a marketplace, that the bazaar is one of these and that 
it has different values governing the practice of exchange, it is clear that the 
marketplace dynamics that De Waal ascribes to politics in Sudan and Somalia are 
actually bazaar dynamics. At this point, one might object and say the two are in 
essence the same, but they are not and noting that they are different is vital if 
De Waal’s concept of the political marketplace is to be clear and useful in the Horn 
and beyond.  
In this section, I show how the bazaar’s organisational structure, the role of the 
merchant and the centrality of bargaining in the bazaar act together to differentiate a 
bazaar from a generic/Liberal marketplace. Accordingly, this section illustrates how 
the bazaar’s primary function and the dominant behaviour within it are different from 
those of a generic/Liberal marketplace. This is done, primarily, by referring to the 
ethnographic evidence collected by Geertz and Rosen and with reference to their 
analysis and conclusions. This will contextualise De Waal’s concept of the political 
marketplace and illustrate how one cannot ignore the influence of Sunni Islam and its 
political culture on how the marketplace is conceptualised in Sudan and Somalia and, 
more broadly speaking, those countries within the Horn and beyond in which the 
discursive tradition of Sunni Islam is dominant. In Ethiopia, only 33% of its population 
identify with Sunni Islam and so, although this is a significant proportion, it is not its 
dominant discursive tradition.54 For this reason, I will not refer to Ethiopia in this 
section, as its conceptualisation of the marketplace is unlikely to be as heavily 
influenced by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam.  
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The Merchant  
I now turn to how Islamic political culture has shaped Muslims’ perceptions of the 
merchant and the prestige of the role, as well as the union between religion, politics 
and commerce that is symbolised in this role. The religious, political and the economic 
have always been so deeply and obviously connected in Islamic history that to 
conceive of one as governed by different and contrasting principles from the other is 
absurd.55 The merchant has always been a powerful and respected figure within Sunni 
Islam’s political culture and the merchant class that has been credited with the 
expansion of Islam from its point of origin in Medina and/or Mecca to areas as far as 
Spain and Turkey.56 This is in contrast to the rather dim view that Christianity had of 
commerce and its practitioners before the reformation.57 To be a successful merchant 
was to be politically, religiously and economically well-connected and well-respected. 
These fields of human interaction were regulated by largely the same principles and 
were all positively responsive to bargaining as a form of exchange and social 
interaction. This meant that the skills of a merchant were transposable and so, 
therefore, also the skills of a politician. To be a merchant and apolitical was unheard 
of. Beyond this, the Islamic merchant had an almost mythological status, which gave 
him symbolic as well political and economic power. 
The following quote illustrates that the merchant/businessman also has a form of moral 
authority within the Islamic political culture: 
Finally, religious traditions differ in their view of the moral disposition of the 
merchant. Christianity tends to take a dim view of merchants and trade, while 
Islam sees no conflict between commerce and virtue. This model should serve 
as a vehicle for understanding how differences in moral teachings affect day-to-
day market activity.58 
This is important to notice as the exchange skills and thriftiness that a merchant 
possesses have moral content in an Islamic political culture, as not only is commerce 
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not in conflict with virtue, but it is actively encouraged as one way of being virtuous. 
This element of Islamic political culture plays an important role in how those who 
participate in the political marketplace/bazaar are perceived and how they perceive 
themselves. This quote from De Waal is an example of the moral pride that a 
particularly successful participant of the political bazaar in Sudan has in his role:  
He [Majzoub] returned time and again to his principles: he would not give in on 
a certain claim because it would have wider repercussions, and that would be a 
violation of the legitimate demands of others. Majzoub took pride in managing 
a complicated and perilous system: for him, it was not only a career but a 
calling.59 
The term ‘calling’ is best explained with reference to the historic role of the merchant 
in Sunni Islamic political culture because it locates De Waal’s political entrepreneur 
within the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. This section shows that rather than the 
political entrepreneur being a novel type of political actor in a contemporary system 
of governance (the political marketplace), there is, in fact, significant continuity 
between the merchant, his skillset and role in society, and De Waal’s political 
entrepreneur. A quote from Montgomery Watt is instructive with regard to how this 
process containing adaptation and continuation can be understood: 
In general then, it may be concluded that the adoption of occidental ideas by 
Muslims has usually served some pre-existing Islamic purposes and that the 
political life of Muslims is controlled by age-old patterns. Two matters are 
specially prominent: first, the real solidarity of the umma or community of all 
Muslims; and secondly, the existence of the Shari’a as a divinely given sunna 
or model of social life.60 
Using my argument’s terminology, the term ‘age-old patterns’ could be replaced with 
the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam; this quote explains the dynamics of 
simultaneous continuation and adaptation well, if combined with the conceptualisation 
of Sunni Islam as a discursive tradition. 
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Given this background, it becomes clear why political leaders within the Sunni Islamic 
political culture have in most cases been astute and skilful merchants/businessmen; to 
be one and no the other is to be imprudent. Therefore, it is no surprise that the political 
leaders of Sudan and Somalia, in particular, are also astute businessmen and use these 
skills to manage their political affairs as well. This feature of Islamic political culture 
emerges from its conceptualisation of the ‘marketplace’ (the bazaar) as emergent from 
the social and political realities, and not as a distinct field of human interaction that is 
governed by distinct norms and values. Accordingly, the bazaar is conceptualised as a 
network of human interrelations, which must be actively and continually engaged with 
in a personable manner if one is to gain further economic and political prestige or 
maintain the prestige he or she already has. This is in contrast to the abstracted, 
idealised and mechanistic conceptualisation of the marketplace that is employed in the 
generic/Liberal conceptualisation of the market, and which informs De Waal’s 
political marketplace. 
Bargaining and the Bazaar 
The most instructive source on the way in which the bazaar is different from what has 
become a generic/Liberal conceptualisation of the marketplace is Geertz and his study 
of a Moroccan bazaar. I will supplement this with Rosen’s anthropological 
ethnography of the Moroccan city of Sefrou. Geertz’s work is revealing, in that a close 
reading of his description and conceptualisation of the bazaar reveals that the bazaar’s 
dynamics are far more similar to the power dynamics in Sudan and Somalia, as 
described by De Waal. If De Waal’s concept is to remain useful, then the dynamics of 
legitimacy in the Horn are more like those of bazaar than those of a generic/Liberal 
marketplace. Thus, it would be more accurate to reconceptualise De Waal’s political 
marketplace in Sudan, and the other countries in which Sunni Islam is dominant, as a 
political bazaar. Although Geertz’s work has been the cause of much discussion, 
criticism and defence within the academy since it was written, most scholars agree 
with his observation (which has been further researched and validated by his students, 
one of whom is Rosen) that bargaining is the dominant social action in most, if not all, 
societies in which Sunni Islam is the dominant discursive tradition. 
Additional contextualisation of Geertz’s study of Islamic society in his book Islam 
Observed is important, as it shows how influential the discursive tradition of Islam is 
in influencing marketplace conceptions and an agent’s motivations for action across 
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different geographic and historical contexts. In Islam Observed, Geertz studies the two 
furthest apart Islamic countries: Morocco and Indonesia. The aim of this study was to 
learn and discern how influential the discursive tradition of Islam has been in shaping 
people’s beliefs, motivations and actions, regardless of geographical proximity. This 
is the reason that he chose such otherwise different societies. He wanted to isolate 
Islam to discern what Sunni Islam did or did not influence in a society in which it was 
dominant. This finding and Geertz and his students’ work is relevant to my conceptual 
analysis of De Waal’s political marketplace, which concludes that bargaining is the 
most pervasive political behaviour in the Horn.61 This finding, which is connected to 
Geertz’s work on what makes a bazaar distinct from a generic/Liberal marketplace, is 
used in this section to develop an alternative and, in some ways, novel explanation of 
political behaviour in the Horn.  
Two of the most important features that differentiate the bazaar from the 
generic/Liberal species of a marketplace are: clientelisation (better defined by Rosen 
as the centrality of a network of interdependent interrelations between individuals in 
the bazaar) and bargaining’s predominance as a form of exchange.62 Geertz refers to 
these features as ‘search procedures’: ways in which bazaaris (men who buy and sell 
goods or services in the bazaar) gather reliable information pertaining to the bazaar, a 
most important asset for a bazaari given the manifest lack of easily accessible and 
reliable information in the bazaar.63 These two features are also the most important 
features of the politics of Sudan and Somalia, according to De Waal, and thus we see 
that it is necessary that if one is prompted to conceptualise legitimacy in Sudan and 
Somalia and other countries in which Sunni Islam is dominant as akin to a 
marketplace, then one should actually use the concept of the bazaar instead and not 
the generic/Liberal species of a marketplace.64 
A difference of the bazaar that is related to why bargaining is one of the central 
features of the bazaar is, as Geertz writes, ‘The centrality of exchange skills (rather 
than production or managerial ones) puts a tremendous emphasis on knowing what 
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particular things are actually selling for and what sorts of things they precisely are.’65 
This preference for exchange and the pre-existence of exchange skills within the 
society that the bazaar emerges from more parsimoniously describe the continual 
exchange of power so prevalent in the politics of the Horn. This preference and 
aptitude for exchange makes the bureaucratic and managerial model of governance, 
such as the modern state, an unlikely choice. Instead, it makes the political bazaar’s 
logic of exchange and emphasis on exchange skills (bargaining and negotiation) a far 
more likely one. This difference between the generic/Liberal species of the 
marketplace and the bazaar supplies evidence about how different discursive traditions 
and their political cultures conceptualise the ‘marketplace’. It also reveals how, given 
the central roles that bargaining and clientalism play in De Waal’s political 
marketplace, it is more accurate to rename his concept ‘the political bazaar’ when 
applying it to the context of Sudan and Somalia and other societies in which Sunni 
Islam is the dominant discursive tradition. Not only is it more accurate, but its 
usefulness will increase significantly, as it conceptualises politics with reference to a 
known and local concept: the bazaar. 
‘Here, as elsewhere in the bazaar, everything rests finally on a personal confrontation 
between intimate antagonists.’66 This quote from Geertz’s work emphasises the 
personal nature of interactions in the bazaar that makes defining features of the bazaar 
such as bargaining and clientship relationships possible. The centrality and importance 
of personal relations in the bazaar is in contrast to the impersonal relations idealised 
within generic/Liberal conceptualisations of a ‘marketplace’. In chapter two of his 
book, De Waal writes about the price of the commodities of loyalty and cooperation 
being determined by supply and demand.67 The previous quote shows the problem 
with assuming the price mechanism exists in all marketplaces in the same form. In the 
bazaar, the interpersonal bargaining ultimately sets the price and although supply and 
demand may be one of the factors that determines the price, the two people, their 
personal networks of interdependent interrelations and their respective influence are 
what ultimately determines the final price. Additionally, the term ‘intimate 
antagonists’ speaks to the type of relationship that the bazaaris have; as De Waal 
notes, it is a paradox that denotes the personal, but simultaneously impersonal nature 
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of the political marketplace.68 Geertz’s understanding of the nature of relationships in 
the bazaar, revealed by the previous quote, enables us to explain that relations are not 
impersonal and personal simultaneously; they are always personal, but defined by both 
adversary and cooperation.69 If this relationship is understood in light of the nature of 
relationships between bazaaris, then one needn’t characterise the nature of political 
relations in the political bazaar as paradoxical, as De Waal does. I have shown again 
why De Waal would improve the usefulness of his concept of the political marketplace 
if he reconceptualised it as a political bazaar and acknowledged that although 
legitimacy may indeed resemble a bazaar, it is not because power and loyalty can be 
sold to the highest bidder, but because bargaining and negotiation are the predominant 
behaviours in the bazaar. 
Another important observation that Geertz makes, in connection with the clientelism 
that exists in the bazaar, is that, ‘ “Adversaries” is the word, for clientship relations 
are not dependency relations, but competitive ones. Clientship is symmetrical, 
egalitarian, and oppositional. There are no “patrons” in the master and man sense 
here.’70 This is an important observation about the nature of relationships between 
men in the bazaar, but it is not exclusive to relationships in the bazaar.71 Rather, 
relationships and networks of relationships between men in a society dominated by 
the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam are characterised by a process of bargaining 
and negotiation in all areas of social interaction: economic, political and religious. To 
explore why this is the case, what it means for a concept like the political marketplace, 
and how important it and related features of Sunni Islam are in furthering the present 
explanation of legitimacy and political behaviour in the Horn, I turn to Rosen’s work 
and ethnographic evidence contained in his book Bargaining For Reality. 
3.2 Bargaining as a Dominant Social Action  
Upon further reading of Geertz and his student’s work (Rosen), I have understood that 
the behaviour of bargaining has shaped the very structure of the bazaar. This means 
that the bazaar should be understood as an entity that is primarily concerned with 
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establishing conventions and values that facilitate bargaining, and not efficiency 
which the generic/Liberal species of the marketplace primarily facilitates. Bargaining 
is viewed as a legitimate form of social action in the discursive tradition of Sunni 
Islam, and the bazaar has been and continues to be structured around facilitating this 
behaviour. Understanding this element of Geertz and Rosen’s works prompted further 
research to see why bargaining is such a pervasive and highly regarded social 
behaviour within the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam that the bazaar has been 
structured around it. What was so informative and relevant for my main critique of the 
political marketplace and my own explanation for political behaviour in the Horn was 
that, rather than bargaining alone being the dominant behaviour in the bazaar and 
being primarily an economic behaviour, Rosen’s work shows that it is the dominant 
social action in the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. This means that the political 
marketplace is not a contemporary system of governance; bargaining has been central 
to governance and the creation and maintenance of social cohesion and political order 
in societies dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam since its origins in 
seventh century Arabia.72 Therefore, this section relies heavily on quotes from Rosen’s 
work that show how pervasive bargaining is in a society dominated by the discursive 
tradition of Sunni Islam: Sefrou city in Morocco. 
Rosen and Geertz’s works show that bargaining is the dominant social action in 
societies dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, and my work builds on 
their argument, arguing that this is the case because of bargaining’s vitality, its 
openness to pragmatic considerations and the metaphysics of Sunni Islam. These 
factors make it the best behaviour to deal with uncertainty and a lack of reliable 
information, without violating the principle of Gharar. Saleh describes the principle 
of Gharar as prohibiting the sale of goods such as unripe and un-harvested dates for 
their future (ripe) value because of the uncertainty surrounding both their quantity and 
quality in the future.73 This principle is related to the epistemology of Sunni Islam and 
the limitations of human knowledge, which asserts absolutely that man cannot know 
the future, only Allah can. Accordingly, humans cannot jeopardise social relations or 
the social cohesion and solidarity of their communities by making compacts in the 
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present that need a certain uncertain future to be realised in order be equitable. The 
way this principle is applied is illustrated in the following quote: 
Throughout the election candidates themselves avoided direct confrontations 
and refrained from phrasing their opposition to another’s candidacy in terms that 
might appear impassioned or inflexible. They knew that to do otherwise might 
well alienate those voters who recognized that today’s opponent might be 
tomorrow’s ally and that strict alignment in this situation might damage the 
flexibility of social relations everyone was desirous of maintaining.74 
This observation of the behaviour of candidates and voters in the regional elections in 
Sefrou illustrates how people apply their judgement and reason to an uncertain future 
in a society dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. The way time is 
conceptualised and the prescriptions around how to interact with it, present in the 
metaphysics of the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, are vital in understanding why 
bargaining is its dominant social action. Gardet echoes this understanding: 
As Gardet put it: ‘Time is less the measurement of movement than an 
indisputable sign of the impermanence of things.’ Unlike the prophet in Judeo-
Christian thought who prefigures the future in the present, the prophet in Islam 
cuts into time to repeat and reaffirm the instantaneousness of God’s creative 
power and His age-free compact with man.75 
This understanding of time prompts the individual to find a form of social behaviour 
that is alive and open-ended, and that deals with change and the guarantee of 
impermanence effectively. This form of social behaviour is bargaining. Understanding 
that the roots of bargaining’s legitimacy as a dominant social action are in the 
metaphysics of Sunni Islam enables one to recognise why it is the pervasive political 
behaviour in societies dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, given the 
even more impermanent nature of political relations and alliances.  
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With regard to how time is understood as an ‘indisputable sign of the impermanence 
of things’ within the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, De Waal’s thoughts around 
uncertainty and time in the Horn are that: 
The stable, cumulative, and systemic concept of institutions is a reflection of a 
later Western world, more sure of its direction. It becomes, however, blunt and 
illogical when applied to a reality that seems, to those who live it, altogether less 
settled. Like pragmatists, they have to apply reason and judgment to horizons of 
contingency rather than applying a narrow calculative rationality to given 
variables.76  
I agree with this argument to a large extent, as is evident by the discussion around how 
bargaining lends itself to pragmatic considerations and an impermanent social world. 
However, I would add that in societies in which Sunni Islam is the dominant discursive 
tradition, principles such as Gharar, with their roots in the metaphysics of Sunni Islam, 
heavily influence, along with pragmatism, the way reason and judgement are applied 
to the future. I find the influence of the principle of Gharar specifically evident in the 
preference of De Waal’s political entrepreneurs for short-term agreements within the 
political marketplace, and these agreements frequent re-negotiations. Rather than De 
Waal’s explanation that these short-term agreements are a result of the capricious and 
self-interested nature of political entrepreneurs and fluctuations in their ‘political 
budgets’, I argue that the prohibition of making exchanges based on future or 
unrealised value better explains why the mentioned political behaviour is so pervasive. 
Additionally, the practice within the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, of pursuing 
as many alternatives as possible in preparing for the heightened uncertainty of such an 
‘unsettled’ world, is made clear by Rosen when he writes: 
Faced with an economic and political environment of substantial uncertainty and 
a physical environment by considerable, though seldom debilitating, 
fluctuations of climate, […] alliances will be formed with members of several 
different tribes or factions and a father may take care to place one son in a 
dominant political party and another in the opposition. In each of these instances 
the need to know the alternatives available and to distribute one’s risk within 
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and beyond the bonds of kinship, residence, and occupations is seen as 
preeminent.77 
This quote aptly describes the nature of political relationships and behaviour in the 
Horn and, rather than using the concept of the political marketplace to do this, it uses 
the assumption that bargaining is the predominant social action in societies in which 
the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam is dominant.  
I do not maintain that bargaining is not present in other societies around the world, as 
it almost certainly is, but I do maintain that it is not the most pervasive political, social 
and economic behaviour in these societies, as it is in societies in which the discursive 
tradition of Sunni Islam is dominant. The failure of the Comprehensive Peace Act 
(CPA) in Sudan can in part be explained in light of bargaining’s prevalence and 
perceived social and political purpose in an ever-changing world. The CPA was a 
peace agreement (effectively a truce) signed in 2005 between the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government of Sudan.78 Originally and for 
some time, the various stakeholders of the agreement complied with the terms of the 
agreement, but as the political and economic environment began to change, so the 
stakeholders began to deviate from the terms of the agreement and seek out new 
agreements which more accurately reflected the new political and economic 
environment and which were not so rigid. To have a social compact that is completely 
set in stone outside of what is contained within Sharia is highly unlikely in a society 
that is dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam and its predominant social 
action, bargaining. Furthermore, not only is it unlikely, it is undesirable for those 
influenced by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, given that so final an agreement 
would be imprudent given the way time is understood. 
With this in mind, it is important to show how even the concepts used to understand 
social, political and economic relations are themselves up for negotiation and 
bargaining in these societies. What informs this process is usually a mixture of 
pragmatism, convention and creation.79 Rosen shows how these concepts are up for 
negotiation with his analysis of the concept of haqq. 
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Haqq can be understood to mean: reality, right, duty, obligation, truth, title or claim.80 
With regard to which one of these English words best communicates the concept, 
Rosen writes: ‘In its most fundamental sense it means reality, but a reality that, 
because it centres on Allah and is suffused by Islamic doctrine, is not to be equated 
with Western conceptions of the real.’81 Having grounded the concept of haqq, he then 
goes on to speak about how it is most commonly understood in contemporary Sefrou: 
‘To speak of haqq is, in short, to convey that sense of mutual obligation that binds 
men to men and men to God.’82 What is most interesting and relevant for our 
discussion, however, is that what is and is not a case of haqq is bargained over. 
Quoting Rosen at length is, again, instructive: 
Indeed, we may characterize the process by which individuals construct a 
network of obligations as one of negotiation. For not only does each person seek 
to place his acts and concomitantly his obligations, where they may later prove 
most advantageous, but, as we have already seen suggested in other contexts, 
the very definition of a situation – as one involving one kind of obligation or 
another, as implying a haqq or merely a fabor [favour] – is itself open to 
bargaining.83 
The fact that not only is the content of one’s social obligation to another negotiated, 
but whether there is, in fact, an obligation or not is negotiated is important, because 
De Waal asserts that, along with power, loyalty is bought and sold to the highest bidder 
in the Horn. If the analyst acknowledges that the concepts that determine social, 
political and economic relations are themselves subject to constant bargaining, then 
one sees that the terms bought and sold are not entirely accurate, as they are too final. 
Loyalty is not bought and sold, it is in a constant state of negotiation, as is the concept 
of haqq each time it is employed. Consent in Sunni Islam’s world of social obligations 
is not final; it is ongoing and enacted through the process of continual bargaining. 
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To further illustrate the pervasiveness of bargaining as a behaviour in societies in 
which Sunni Islam is the dominant discursive tradition, this section will discuss the 
concept of kinship ties with reference to the following quote from Rosen: 
It is not simply that individuals manipulate their ties of kinship – a feature 
common enough to virtually all societies. Rather, it is that at the very heart of 
the concept of kinship in Morocco lies the recognition that relational 
possibilities are inherently matters to be bargained over and that this is no less 
true of kin ties than of bonds of patronage, friendship, or political alliance.84 
De Waal argues briefly and dismissively that kinship ties are instrumentalised in the 
political marketplace and that political entrepreneurs use their kinship ties to decrease 
the cost of their kin’s loyalty. Although we can see from Rosen’s anthropological 
research that this might be true to an extent, it does not accurately describe or 
understand the nature of kinship ties in societies in which Sunni Islam is dominant. 
Rather than kinship ties being instrumentalised by those pursuing political power to 
attain the loyalty or support of a certain constituency or faction, Rosen’s work shows 
that although kinship may be viewed as a political resource, it is also subject to the 
concept of haqq (social obligation) and, therefore, it is unlikely that an individual can 
actually instrumentalise it without both the concepts of kinship and haqq imposing 
constraints and obligations on him or her. Granted, if the individual who is employing 
kinship is a skilled negotiator and bargains well, he or she can decrease the constraints 
both social conventions impose, but they will not be able to escape their constraints 
entirely. 
One might ask at this point why a member of such a society would not see the 
dominance of bargaining as a social action as deleterious to their society’s social and 
political stability. This question, however, fails to understand that it is for the purposes 
of social cohesion and political order and stability that bargaining is the dominant 
social action in such a society. This is the case because if the world of social 
obligations (political, religious and economic) is too rigid and inflexible, then it is 
unable to adapt to change and change is a certainty, given Sunni Islam’s conception 
of time as the sign of the impermanence of things. Thus, having bargaining as the 
dominant social action keeps the world of social obligations malleable and, therefore, 
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able to ensure that social cohesion and political order is maintained throughout the 
constant impermanence of things (time). 
3.3 Conclusion 
Having shown how pervasive bargaining is as a social action in societies dominated 
by Sunni Islam, and how it permeates all forms of social relations and the concepts 
used to define and understand them, it is important to reflect on what type of social, 
political and economic relations are most prevalent in such societies as a result. The 
first type of relation that must be discussed is the transactional relationship. This is 
because De Waal’s political marketplace would have us believe that this is the 
predominant nature of political relations in the Horn. Given that the Horn and most of 
its countries are dominated by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam and, 
concomitantly, that bargaining is the dominant social action in these countries, I find 
De Waal’s position difficult to agree with.  
With section 3.2 in mind, it becomes clear that transactional relationships are highly 
unlikely, given that in societies in which Sunni Islam is the dominant discursive 
tradition, one’s social obligations to another are seldomly ever annulled. This is largely 
to do with the fact that it makes sense for a person in such a society to, through their 
powers of bargaining and negotiation, create a web of social obligations as a form of 
insurance against the guaranteed uncertainty of change and as a means to secure status. 
If relations were for the most part transactional in nature, then this web could not exist 
in these societies. And not only do we have extensive ethnographic evidence that these 
webs do exist, from Rosen and Geertz’s works, we also know that the purpose of these 
webs is intrinsically linked to the metaphysics of the discursive tradition of Sunni 
Islam, and so their presence and importance is assured in all societies in which Sunni 
Islam is the dominant discursive tradition – the majority of the societies that make up 
the Horn. Rosen expresses this understanding and function of social obligation well: 
‘Rather, the trick is to arrange ties [social obligations] in order to gain the highest 
possible degree of predictability, if not control, over the actions of others.’85 This 
limited control of the social, political and economic world is seen as the best humans 
can do in the face of the guaranteed impermanence of things and, thus, to conclude 
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that transactional relations are the most prevalent relations in the Horn is to 
misunderstand its social, political and economic dynamics. 
At this point, it is important to clarify that I argue that most people in the Horn seek 
out interdependent relationships with others and not transactional relationships – not 
that transactional relationships do not exist. I acknowledge that they do, but to argue 
they are the most pervasive is a mistake. Furthermore, it is a mistake that is brought 
on by De Waal’s failure to embed his political marketplace. The generic/Liberal 
species or understanding of the marketplace assumes that transactional relationships 
between its participants are both the most prevalent and the best, given that they are 
seen as the most efficient, and should be promoted and facilitated by the marketplace 
as a result, given that efficiency is the organising principle of the generic/Liberal 
marketplace.86 Linked to this clarification of De Waal’s concept, it is important that 
the reader remembers that my work is primarily a conceptual analysis of De Waal’s 
political marketplace and that it was this analysis that enabled and prompted me to 
offer the alternative explanation for why bargaining is the predominant political 
behaviour in the Horn, as has been given in this chapter. Furthermore, it will be evident 
from this chapter that rather than seeing the case of the Horn and its pervasive political 
behaviour of bargaining as a case to be best explained by theories of material change 
and their effects on the social, political and economic world, I have used the Horn’s 
dominant discursive tradition to more parsimoniously explain why its predominant 
political behaviour is bargaining. In so doing, I have shown that theories that explain 
continuity are better suited for explaining the political behaviour of the Horn. This is 
the case only if ‘continuity’ is not conflated with ‘unchanging’: a conflation that the 
concept of a discursive tradition, here employed, is not vulnerable to. 
This chapter has shown that Sunni Islam is a major source of legitimacy in the Horn 
and that De Waal’s political marketplace and its conception of legitimacy in the Horn 
does not account for this. Consequently, this chapter has shown that the political 
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bazaar is a source of legitimacy in the Horn because it reflects the values and norms 
of Sunni Islam, primarily in its use of bargaining. This is important because although 
the political bazaar has its own form of legitimacy, it would not have this legitimacy 
in a society that was not dominated by Sunni Islam. Having identified the source of 
legitimacy that undergirds the political bazaar’s form of legitimacy, it has become 
evident that there are at least two sources of legitimacy in the Horn that are 
interconnected: the political bazaar and Sunni Islam. This chapter has also shown how 
important context and history are in understanding how those in the Horn understand 
legitimacy. Given this, and the continuity over centuries that has been observed in 
terms of the dominance of bargaining as a social action in the Horn, I deem it necessary 
to employ a third concept to more accurately understand the nature of legitimacy in 
the Horn: the primordial public. The reason for this and the consequences it has for 
how I conceptualise legitimacy in the Horn will be made clear in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Continuity and Legitimacy in the Horn 
This chapter aims to argue that the embedded political marketplace (the political 
bazaar) is one of the three major sources of legitimacy in the eyes of those residing in 
the Horn. It shows how the rational logic of exchange and the circulation of power 
which bargaining facilitates give the political bazaar its rational legitimacy. Its rational 
legitimacy is clearly rooted in the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam and the pivotal 
role that bargaining plays within it, and the primordial public, but all three institutions 
operate interdependently to inform people’s understanding of legitimacy in the 
countries dominated by Sunni Islam in the Horn. Sunni Islam and the primordial 
public’s legitimacy, traditional and moral respectively, act in conjunction with the 
political bazaar’s rational legitimacy to inform what it is that the people of the Horn 
consider legitimate and meaningful collective action. The primordial public is a 
concept that was developed by Peter Ekeh and is best understood by quoting him: 
Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the 
one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to 
which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial 
public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are 
expected to give generously and do give materially. Their relationship to the 
primordial public is moral, while their relationship with the civic public is 
amoral.87 
The reason that the primordial public has been included in my work is because it, like 
the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam, is useful for explaining continuity and why 
pervasive behaviours, such as bargaining, persist in a society over time, and because 
it is present in most, if not all, of the societies that make up the Horn.88 These three 
institutions have legitimacy in the Horn, and those that represent them and inhabit 
them are constantly bargaining and negotiating with each other over which form of 
legitimacy will be dominant and primarily determine what is considered legitimate 
behaviour in the Horn. 
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4.1 Conceptualising Legitimacy and its Forms 
I understand legitimacy to be a contextual belief that is synonymous with what is 
fitting and proper.89 Accordingly, I understand political legitimacy to be present in a 
society when the dominant way of exercising power is deemed fitting and proper by 
those who use it and by those who it is used upon.90 I have this understanding as 
legitimacy, like any belief, must be renewed and because shared needs and the meeting 
of them is not sufficient to create legitimacy. There must also be a sharing of values if 
legitimacy is to be present. Given this understanding of legitimacy, an important 
consideration of the following discussion on legitimacy will be the way in which one 
political culture might deem something legitimate that another would not. I will argue 
that legitimacy in the Horn is constituted and determined by three institutions (patterns 
of behaviour) and concepts: the political bazaar, the primordial public and the 
discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. These three institutions have different forms of 
legitimacy that enable them to determine (interdependently and competitively) what 
is and is not politically legitimate. The different forms of legitimacy are: moral 
legitimacy (Sunni Islam), rational legitimacy (the political bazaar), and traditional 
legitimacy (the primordial public) they will be discussed in this section, respectively. 
To clarify, before moving on, these three institutions are stratified so that, on the one 
hand, they conjointly determine how legitimacy is understood in the Horn, in no fixed 
proportion; yet on the other, one of these institutions may be rooted in, emergent from 
and explained by the others.91 
Sunni Islam and Moral Legitimacy in the Horn 
The above understanding of legitimacy characterises it, essentially, as a belief. It is 
therefore important to be mindful of the other beliefs that are present in the minds of 
those in the Horn. As I have argued and shown in chapter three, a significant number 
of these beliefs in the Horn are derived from the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam 
and its conceptual reservoir. I have has also given an account, in chapter three, of the 
interdependent nature of the relationship between Sunni Islam and the political bazaar 
and the way the one informs the other via the dominant social behaviour of Sunni 
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Islam – bargaining – and the way the bazaar is essentially institutionalised bargaining. 
To expand on Sunni Islam as a source of moral legitimacy in the Horn and build on 
the arguments made in chapter three for what this might mean when it comes to 
conceptualising legitimacy in the Horn, this section will refer to Bayart and Foucault. 
Although Bayart and De Waal agree in many areas of their analyses of the Horn, they 
depart at some important junctures. Bayart primarily uses Foucault’s governmentality 
to understand political action, power and the state in Africa, whereas De Waal uses 
the concept of the political marketplace. This difference is important because although 
the political marketplace is an informal institution of power and is in some ways in 
line with Foucault’s notion of governmentality, De Waal excludes other significant 
sources of legitimacy from his analysis, like the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam 
and the primordial public. The Foucauldian conceptualisation of power that Bayart 
uses is more amenable to the influence that the religious component of political culture 
can have on structuring or regulating a subject’s political action. De Waal’s political 
marketplace, on the other hand, is not so amenable to such factors, as he focuses more 
on the material conditions that drive change, not the cultural or ideological factors that 
ensure continuity. It is this exclusion of other sources of legitimacy, such as the 
religious component of political culture (Sunni Islam), that limits De Waal’s 
understanding of legitimacy in the Horn. Additionally, it is important to note an 
observation made by Ellis and Ter Haar that indicates the non-instrumentality of 
religion amongst the Horn’s elites: ‘While it is good politics for a politician to make a 
public profession of religious allegiance in order to be in popularity, there is abundant 
evidence that heads of state also practice religion in private for no obvious clientelist 
motive.’92 This is important to note given De Waal’s argument that religion and other 
appeals to solidarity are mainly instrumental and used to drive down the cost of loyalty 
in his political marketplace 
At this point, it is also important to remember that Foucault’s understanding of how 
governmentality functions is derived from the way in which pastoral power and 
religious power function.93 In the same way that religion prompts one to govern 
oneself in accordance with a conscience informed and guided by religious concepts, 
so the state seeks to do the same through a technology of power which Foucault calls 
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governmentality. This is conjoined with the belief that God or the state might be 
watching you at any given time, the ‘panopticon’. Given that in the Horn 93% of the 
population identifies as Christian or Muslim, there is a high chance that this 
technology of power operates, and in a similar way. De Waal does not account for this 
at all because he fails to embed his political marketplace in the existing social, political 
and religious reality of the Horn. If he had acknowledged this, then he would have 
seen the moral legitimacy that Sunni Islam has in the Horn and he would not argue 
that the accumulation of money and power are ultimate in the political marketplace 
and that political behaviour in the Horn is primarily determined by cost-benefit 
machinations. Instead, he would have seen that Sunni Islam’s moral dictates, 
metaphysics and political culture are a major source of legitimacy in the Horn and play 
a major role in determining its inhabitants’ political behaviour. The moral legitimacy 
possessed by Sunni Islam in the Horn is considerable and, when acknowledged, helps 
the analyst to more fully understand the nature of legitimacy in the Horn. It moves the 
analyst in the direction of a more holistic understanding of legitimacy and political 
behaviour in the Horn that does not confine itself to rational motivations for action 
alone but includes moral motivations for action. 
The Political Bazaar and Rational Legitimacy  
The practice of exchange is first and foremost a way to regulate political behaviour. 
This assertion may seem both bold and misguided, but there is historical evidence to 
support it. In David Graeber’s book Towards an Anthropological Theory of Value: 
The False Coin of Our Own Dreams, he makes this argument time and time again 
referring to many different anthropological and historical examples.94 Contemporary 
examples of political order exist in the absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence 
like Somaliland, Bouganville and, some even say, Northern Kivu.95 I use the example 
of the Five First People’s Nations (on the east coast of North America), however, to 
point out why the bazaar and the practice of exchange it facilitates is primarily a 
mechanism to regulate political behaviour – creating political order – a necessary 
condition for the creation of wealth, which in turn is used to practise exchange and 
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reinforce, and augment the existent political stability. What occurs in the bazaar as a 
result of the practice and logic of exchange is an exchange and circulation of power, 
according to Graeber. This exchange and circulation of power makes it possible for 
political order to exist without a legitimate monopoly of violence being present. Bayart 
quotes Lonsdale: ‘the most distinctive contribution of Africa to the history of humanity 
has in fact been the civilised art of living in a reasonably peaceful way without a state 
[legitimate monopoly of violence].’96 This quote, although general, brings to mind the 
political bazaar and resonates with both Bayart and De Waal’s criticisms of 
authoritarian high modernism and Bayart’s appreciation for Africa’s historicity which 
makes the formation of the modern state, in the Weberian sense, highly unlikely in the 
Horn. Beyond the improbability of the state emerging as a political reality in the Horn, 
Bayart and De Waal’s works both point to the fact that there are systems of governance 
that better suit the Horn and that pursuing the construction of a statist political order 
is unhelpful, if not irrelevant, in the Horn.  
Graeber writes about the Five Nations and the way power was regulated through its 
symbolic exchange and circulation of power, and not a legitimate monopoly of 
violence. This was done through the giving and receiving of ‘wampum’ which were 
‘small cylindrical beads made by North American Indians from shells, strung together 
and worn as decoration or used as money’.97 This is an example of how the practice 
of exchange of items of value has been a way of regulating power for a long time and 
is not something novel, although it is definitely not prescribed today as a system of 
governance, given the state’s dominance. Graeber goes on to give many more 
anthropological examples of how the practice of exchange is used to regulate power. 
This understanding of the practice of exchange as existing for reasons other than the 
accumulation of wealth through trade surpluses is important to understand if we are to 
see how the political bazaar uses the practice of exchange to regulate power, in the 
same way the state might use its monopoly of power to regulate it. I will not spend too 
much of this chapter labouring this point, as De Waal has argued well and succinctly 
for it in his book. Given the arguments of De Waal and the previous example, one can 
see how the political marketplace has a rational form of legitimacy in that its processes 
can lead to political order through the exchange and circulation of power. Having said 
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this, however, I elaborate on how the practice of exchange manifests itself as 
bargaining in the political bazaar and how this instils it with rational legitimacy. 
By rational legitimacy, I mean the perceived rational nature of the logic of exchange 
of the political bazaar. It is because of this logic and the fact that bargaining is 
institutionalised in the bazaar that it is seen as source of rational legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Horn’s public. The logic of the political bazaar is a logic of exchange and 
although not legal in its expression, it acts similarly to the law in that it constrains and 
enables actors within certain fields of action. This logic, although not codified and 
enshrined in law, is seen as legitimate and thus instils the political bazaar and its 
processes with rational legitimacy. At this point, I must show that I am aware that 
within Weber’s three types of authority there is no rational authority per se, rather 
rational-legal authority.98 I, however, do not see this as an issue, given the lack of 
formal institutions and laws in the Horn and my argument that the bazaar’s logic of 
exchange mediated by its institutionalisation of bargaining acts in a similar fashion to 
the law or the judiciary and the separation of powers that it enforces and protects. 
Furthermore, within Weber’s context of Western Europe, the legal was understood to 
be rational and vice versa. The law had legitimacy because those who it governed 
understood it as rational and because its power was validated through its enforcement. 
In the case of the Horn, the enforcement of the law is sporadic and, when it is enforced, 
it is often for personal gain rather than for the good of society. The relationship 
between rationality and legality therefore must be understood differently in the Horn. 
The logic of exchange and circulation of power has rational legitimacy because it 
endorses and facilitates the moral culture that is prevalent in the Horn that condemns 
and sometimes prevents the monopolisation of power by an individual or a group of 
individuals.99 Additionally, given that the bazaar institutionalises bargaining and 
bargaining’s position as the dominant social action in Sunni Islam, we see why the 
political bazaar is viewed as being a source of rational legitimacy. This understanding 
of law as culture is very interesting and applicable in the case of the Horn. Rosen 
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writes about it in Law as Culture: An Invitation.100 Unfortunately there is insufficient 
time to explore it in this piece of work. 
The Primordial Public and Traditional Legitimacy 
Peter Ekeh argues that in the Horn there are two publics: the primordial public and the 
civic public. The primordial public is the effectively the local public and the civic 
public is the national public. He argues that the dialectic between these two publics 
accounts for many of the political phenomena and behaviour that we observe in the 
Horn. Ekeh grounds his argument in the historicity of the state in Africa in the same 
way that Bayart does, but he places more emphasis on the influence that the colonial 
period had on contemporary Horn politics. I have made use of Ekeh’s work because it 
acknowledges an important feature of the Horn politics that De Waal’s marketplace 
does not. By arguing that the dialectic between the two publics is a cause of many of 
the Horn’s political dynamics, he brings the ‘public’ and its traditions into the study 
of politics in the Horn in an accurate and revealing way. This is something that De 
Waal does not do, and his analysis of the Horn and the concept of the political 
marketplace are worse off as a result. Ekeh argues that these two publics have post-
colonial ideologies of legitimation that they employ to legitimate their hold on their 
own people.101 These ideologies of legitimation are still employed today and I will 
discuss them, as they are essential if one is to more holistically understand the nature 
of legitimacy in the Horn.  
Ekeh’s theoretical statement regarding the two publics in the Horn is important 
because it highlights that there are two spheres of political action and each sphere has 
different strategies of legitimation. Ekeh goes on to argue that these spheres of political 
action have different motivations for action. In the primordial or local public, morality 
and a collectivist sense of wellbeing primarily motivate action and accordingly are 
also used to legitimate action within it. In the civic public or national public, apathy 
and amorality and extractive self-interest primarily motivate action and accordingly 
are used to legitimate action within it. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
explains the simultaneous moral and amoral nature of the Horn politics that De Waal 
struggles to comprehend. Secondly, and importantly with regard to the discussion on 
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legitimacy, it helps us see that the primordial public has traditional and moral 
legitimacy in the eyes of those who inhabit it, given the moral and collectivist 
motivations for actions within it, the sense and foundation of identity (clan, tribe or 
son of…) that it supplies to its members and the way it services its members’ material 
needs.102 This legitimacy is important, as the legitimacy of the civic public, which is 
conceptualised similarly to De Waal’s political marketplace, is dependent on it. The 
political marketplace’s legitimacy is dependent on this because it is a common 
understanding among people in the Horn that there are different primordial publics 
within a nation, region and subcontinent, and that they compete and at times 
collaborate with one another to extract as much as they can from the political 
marketplace/civic public. Thus, the reason amoral and apathetic behaviour is seen as 
legitimate in the civic public/political marketplace is because all of the participants 
know that this kind of behaviour will sustain their primordial public and that it is one’s 
traditional duty to sustain and prioritize the primordial public. This adds nuance to De 
Waal’s analysis of legitimacy in the Horn, as by acknowledging the two publics and 
how their presence affects the nature of legitimacy in the Horn, the role of money is 
not over-determined in explaining political behaviour in the region, as this explanation 
accounts for the influence local tradition has on what is deemed legitimate and how 
legitimacy is understood in the Horn. 
I conceptualise the primordial public’s legitimacy as being most akin to traditional 
legitimacy because of what its name suggests, but further explanation is required given 
the mention of moral legitimacy in the previous paragraph. Ekeh writes: 
At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties and 
sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour. I shall call 
this the primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial 
groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless impinge on the public 
interest.103  
Although Ekeh emphasises the moral nature of political action in the primordial 
public, as mentioned above and earlier in this section, its legitimacy is not primarily 
moral in nature. Rather, as the above quote shows, its primary source of legitimacy is 
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tradition and it refers to or employs this to compel people to act in accordance with 
tradition. Acknowledging not only that the Horn has two publics, but that the 
primordial public is an institution which has significant traditional legitimacy is 
important as it allows us to see that there are three institutions and sources of 
legitimacy that primarily inform how people living in the Horn understand legitimacy. 
Understanding the primordial public as one of the three institutions that serve as 
sources of legitimacy in the Horn is important as it allows the analyst to see that 
morality, tradition and integrity are not absent from understandings of legitimacy in 
the Horn, which is De Waal’s lament. These three institutions all have considerable 
legitimacy in the eyes of people in the Horn. Figure 1 depicts the dynamics that have 
just been described and shows that the reason that legitimacy resembles a bazaar in 
the Horn is because of how the people within these institutions bargain over and 
negotiate with each institution’s concepts and understandings of legitimacy, in order 
to try to ensure that their concepts and understandings of legitimacy are the ones that 
inform most people’s motivations for action. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1 is essentially a visual representation of this entire work and its thesis, which 
builds on and develops De Waal’s political marketplace, while showing through its 
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critique that the political bazaar is only one of three institutions which serve as the 
major sources for legitimacy in the Horn. The smaller blue arrows within the circle 
represent individuals residing in the Horn, as actors are influenced at different times 
and with different degrees of influence by the three institutions of legitimacy. Given 
the importance of Figure 1, I will discuss some dynamics of legitimacy in Horn that it 
may not immediately communicate or cannot account for given its two-dimensional 
nature. 
The first of these dynamics is that the question of which institution most influences 
people’s understanding of legitimacy (the political bazaar, the primordial public or the 
discursive tradition of Sunni Islam) is the wrong question. Rather, Figure 1 should 
help one understand that a better question is when is one of the three institutions more 
influential than the others and why. This could be shown if the thick blue arrows of 
each source increased and decreased, depicting that no institution is without influence 
at any given time, but that their amount of influence is temporally and contextually 
determined and thus each institution’s influence waxes and wanes. With this 
understanding of legitimacy in the Horn in mind, it is important to remind the reader 
that I answered the above question in chapter three, by arguing that the anthropological 
and historical evidence suggests that the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam most 
influences people’s understandings of what is legitimate in the Horn today. 
The second dynamic that is not immediately communicated is that each of the different 
institutions all have the three types of legitimacy mentioned (moral, rational and 
traditional) in some measure, but the type of legitimacy ascribed to them in Figure 1 
is the predominant form of legitimacy they have in the understandings of the people 
in the Horn. This is important, as in order for the three legitimate institutions and their 
participants to negotiate and bargain with each other (the red arrows), there needs to 
be common reference points between all three of them and this is what a measure of 
each type of legitimacy present in each institution facilitates. 
The third and final dynamic Figure 1 does not convey is that in each country (or even 
locality) in the Horn, the three institutions’ concepts to interpret reality and inform 
action may vary. This would apply, for example, if this model were applied to 
Ethiopia, which has a different dominant discursive tradition. This means that my 
thesis is not a definitive description of the content of legitimacy in the Horn. Rather, 
this work has explained legitimacy’s fluid nature by proposing that the people in the 
58		
Horn understand the process of legitimation as most akin to bargaining and, 
furthermore, I have described and analysed the inter-institutional dynamics of the three 
major sources of legitimacy that are called on by people in the Horn in the legitimation 
process.  
4.2 Bargaining as the Predominant Process of Legitimation in 
the Horn 
Conceptualising the process of legitimation in the Horn as one most akin to bargaining 
is congruent with my argument in chapter three that showed how and why bargaining 
is the dominant social, political and economic behaviour in the Horn. I hope that my 
argument prevents analysts from being stifled by an understanding of legitimacy that 
is too rigid. Conceptualising the process of legitimation as one of bargaining conveys 
the multitudinous nature of the possible sources of legitimacy one may observe or 
draw on to legitimate their group’s or their own right to power over the other that are 
present in the social world of the Horn. It explains the hybrid blending of these sources 
and forms of legitimacy to justify one’s power that is so pervasive in the Horn.104 This 
section refers to Bayart’s work extensively to make the case that the tireless efforts of 
modernist heads of states and developmentalists to finalise, rigidify and 
institutionalise legitimacy in the Horn will not work, given that the predominant 
process of legitimation in the Horn is bargaining and will remain so because, among 
other reasons, it is well-suited to the political, religious, cultural and geographic 
context of the Horn. 
Bayart speaks about the supposed excess of power in the Horn and he argues that 
rather than there being an excess of power, power is decentralised and, therefore, there 
are more instances in which power is exerted or made to be visible as opposed to 
invisible. This greater number of instances makes the first-time observer think there 
is an excess of power when, in fact, it is because power is not centralised or 
institutionalised. This feature of power exists in the Horn mainly because of the 
immense geographic mobility of societies, which has allowed societies to escape the 
attempts of statist regimes to centralise power. Bayart refers to this as the ‘exit option’ 
in Horn politics and argues that its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial politics are 
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heavily influenced by it. This – combined with the fact that pre-colonial and 
subsequently post-colonial elites’ power is not based on land ownership and their 
ability to alienate people from it – has meant that in the Horn the power to inflict 
violence does not translate into the power to force people to work.105 Although the 
index of power in the pre-colonial period of the Horn’s history was more the control 
of people than land, this control was limited in that it could not be used to force people 
to work.106 With Bayart and Rosen’s focus on the importance of networks of social 
obligation and interrelations in Horn politics, and Ekeh’s primordial public in mind, it 
would seem that the index of power is much the same in contemporary Horn politics: 
the control of people.  
I have discussed how the exit option available to people in the Horn has affected its 
politics and what the index of power is, but more analysis is needed to better 
understand how this affects the legitimisation process in the Horn. To inform this 
analysis, it is necessary once again to refer to Foucault’s conceptualisation of power: 
While the theory of political power as an institution ordinarily refers to a 
juridical conception of the law, it seems to me that the analysis of 
governmentality – that is, the analysis of power as a group of reversible 
relations – must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by relation of self to 
self.107 
Foucault argues that power can only exist where the possibility for freedom also exists; 
a condition for power is the possibility of freedom or the possibility of resistance. This 
understanding of power is salient given the widespread exit option that exists in the 
Horn and the high number of resistance movements recorded in its history. This 
understanding of power, however, has consequences that alter how the use of power 
is justified – the legitimation process. 
What it means for the process of legitimation is contained in this phrase: ‘must refer 
to an ethics of the subject defined by relation of self to self’. As Foucault argues, rather 
than institutions and the law determining what is and is not a justified use of power 
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between two people, the process of legitimating one’s use of power over another is a 
process defined by the nature of the relationship that exists between the two parties 
involved. This very personal process of legitimation is what Foucault argues is the 
dominant form of legitimation when one does not conceptualise power as institutional 
and it is remarkably similar to how personal bargaining is as a process of legitimation. 
Consequently, the most legitimate way to exercise power in the Horn is by engaging 
an adversary or a friend in a process of bargaining in which you convince them, by 
using all the resources available to you, to perceive the situation in the way you do 
and to take a course of action that is to your advantage.108  
The amount of visible/physical violence committed by governments in the Horn does 
not contradict the nature of power and legitimacy within a governmentality 
understanding of power. Graeber speaks of Foucault and his idea of power moving 
from the visible and material to the invisible (governmentality) and the notion of 
omniscient vision, and largely agrees. However, rather than viewing this as a clean 
break between two entirely different regimes, as Foucault does, Graeber argues that 
these are two different modalities of power.109 This is important with regard to the 
previous paragraph and in conceptualising power in the Horn, as power is still very 
much what is seen, as Foucault said about feudal power in The Subject and Power, but 
it is also about what is invisible, as Bayart, with reference to Foucault, emphasises.110 
In the Horn, both modalities of power are operative: the visible exertion of power 
associated with a Feudal system and the invisible and relational form of power 
associated with governmentality and modern power. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In conceptualising the process of bargaining as the dominant process of legitimation 
in the Horn, I have grounded the understanding of legitimacy in the Horn in its 
dominant political, social, religious and economic behaviour (bargaining). In doing 
so, I have remained true to Geuss’s first thesis: ‘Don’t look at just what they say, think, 
believe, but at what they actually do, and what actually happens as a result’,111 as did 
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De Waal. Why my explanation and analysis of legitimacy and political behaviour in 
the Horn supersedes De Waal’s, however, is because it heeds Geuss’s warning: ‘It is 
no sign of gimlet-eyed realism to deny the enormous and real significance of religious 
practices, beliefs and institutions in the world, past and present, but rather a sign of 
simple blindness.’112 
Rather than formulating a new concept and using theories from the fields of marketing 
and business management to conceptualise legitimacy and explain political behaviour 
in the Horn, I take seriously the impact and ‘significance of religious practices, beliefs 
and institutions in the world, past and present’ in its conceptualisation of legitimacy 
and explanation for political behaviour in the Horn.113 The result of this is an 
alternative explanation, grounded in the Horn’s social and religious realities and not 
just its political and economic realities. It is not money and the practices and values 
associated with it that primarily determine contemporary political behaviour in the 
Horn; at this point in the Horn’s history, it is the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. 
The way I have, in this chapter, presented and formulated the understanding of 
legitimacy in the Horn is only made by possible by combining Geuss, Graeber and 
Weber’s understandings of legitimacy. Geuss builds on Weber’s understanding and 
argues, along with Graeber, that value should be understood as the importance of 
actions, and that ultimately politics is concerned with legitimating different forms of 
collective action.114 This means that, within politics, legitimacy is present if the value 
system undergirding the governance structure symbolically represents to the people 
being governed the value of their own actions. These values do not need to have 
supreme authority (the state model of governance) or be universally accepted, as the 
normative understanding of legitimacy would have us believe. Rather, a governance 
structure can be made up of three different value systems, all of which are primarily 
influenced by different motivations for action and still be deemed legitimate by those 
it governs. This is the case because each of the three value systems reaffirms the 
importance of three different motivations for action, rational, moral and traditional – 
the three predominant motivations for political action in the Horn, each of which is 
                                               
112 Ibid., 11. 113	Ibid.,			
114 Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value; Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 38. 
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institutionalised in the political bazaar, the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam and the 
primordial public, respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I have sought to conceptualise how the majority of people living in the Horn 
understand legitimacy. The point of entry for this investigation was De Waal’s concept 
of the political marketplace, given its initial usefulness throughout the Horn. Although 
this concept was the point of entry, it was made clear from the beginning of my work 
that the focus would be on critiquing, refining and further developing the concept and 
the understanding of legitimacy prompted by the political marketplace. This process 
led me to understand that the political bazaar is one of three major sources of 
legitimacy in the Horn and that these three sources of legitimacy are drawn on in 
combination by the Horn’s inhabitants, to both understand legitimacy and legitimate 
their own actions in the eyes of others. Situating the political marketplace as one of 
three major sources of legitimacy enabled a clearer definition of what the political 
marketplace or more accurately the political bazaar is: an institution structured around 
facilitating bargaining and rational action. Furthermore, embedding De Waal’s 
concept revealed that there are different conceptualisations of a marketplace and that 
these are primarily determined by the dominant religious tradition of a society: Sunni 
Islam in the Horn. Accordingly, I achieved my first three aims: 
o to more clearly define a political marketplace, 
o to identify a different conception of a political marketplace and 
o to show that this different conception is closely related to the 
surrounding political culture, especially the religious dimension of 
political culture. 
Having done this, I moved on to my fourth and final aim: 
o to develop an understanding of why bargaining is the predominant 
political behaviour in the Horn and what this means for how legitimacy 
is understood by those in the Horn. 
Achieving this aim led to the understanding of legitimacy and political behaviour in 
the Horn that is depicted in Figure 1 and explained in chapter four. Further reflection 
on this understanding of legitimacy and how it affects political behaviour will help the 
reader comprehend the consequences of my work’s conclusions, if accepted, for the 
study of legitimacy in the Horn. 
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The three forms of legitimacy ascribed to the three sources of legitimacy identified in 
chapter four (rational, traditional and moral) will remind the reader of Weber’s three 
ideal types of authority and how they serve to both legitimate and inform different 
forms of political behaviour. My understanding of legitimacy and political behaviour 
in chapter four conveys how bargaining (legitimated by Sunni Islam) is the dominant 
process of legitimation in the Horn. This is not just because Sunni Islam legitimates 
it, however, as maintaining bargaining as the predominant political behaviour is also 
in the interests of those who would govern in the Horn. This is the case as it allows 
those who wish to exercise power over others access to numerous sources of 
legitimacy to justify this exertion of power. Concomitantly, it also means that when 
their exertion of power comes to be deemed illegitimate by one source of legitimacy, 
they shift their ‘allegiance’ and reconfigure their sources of legitimacy by bargaining 
with those who represent the three institutions in the Horn.  
The reason I am revisiting this is because political actors in the Horn do not draw on 
predominantly one source of legitimacy to legitimate their rule; they draw on as many 
sources of legitimacy as they can, namely traditional, moral and rational, through a 
process of bargaining with each other, those who represent the three institutions and 
those they would exert their power on. Weber knew that his ideal types were just that, 
ideal, but he still argued that in Western Europe the state primarily legitimated itself 
through rational-legal authority. In the Horn, no such argument can be made, given 
that there is no consensus on what form of legitimacy should have ultimate authority 
in the social world or, at a metaphysical level, whether ultimate authority should lie in 
human hands or in their institutions, both formal and informal. This fluid and 
bargained-over nature of legitimacy prompts the analyst to understand legitimacy in 
the Horn as resembling a bazaar. Not for the reasons De Waal gives, however, but 
because of the dominance of bargaining as a social action in the discursive tradition 
of Sunni Islam and the similarity between the dynamics that exist between the three 
major institutions and those that represent them in the Horn, and the dynamics of 
bargaining.  
In light of this, the concepts that should be employed in conjunction with each other 
to best understand the nature of legitimacy in the Horn are: the political bazaar, the 
primordial public and the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. Additionally, I have 
found that the state competes for legitimacy in the Horn with the primordial public, 
the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam and, emergent from this, the political bazaar. 
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The questioning of the state model of governance that results from this competition 
should inspire those involved in governance in the Horn to take note and to understand 
governance as a far more decentralised phenomenon in the Horn, but not to conflate 
this decentralisation with anarchy.  
Understanding legitimacy in the way argued for in chapter four means that those who 
mainly focus on governments’ service delivery capacity in the Horn misunderstand 
the nature of legitimacy in the Horn as being primarily instrumental. Additionally, 
those who take issue with the value systems of governance structures in the Horn on 
normative grounds misunderstand that legitimacy is a contextual belief that is 
synonymous with what is fitting and proper in that specific context.115 Accordingly, I 
understand legitimacy to be present in a society when the dominant way of exercising 
power (bargaining) is deemed fitting and proper by both those who exercise it and 
those whom it is exercised upon.116 Thus, legitimacy needs to be understood 
substantively rather than instrumentally or normatively in the Horn. What is primarily 
meant by substantive, beyond its immediate connotations, is that legitimacy should be 
embedded and located in the political history and contemporary context of the Horn.117 
This will give substance to the concept of legitimacy in the Horn and allow those 
studying it to see that the collective motivations for action in the Horn are not only 
rational, they are also moral and traditional. Furthermore, it will allow the analyst to 
understand that people in the Horn consider bargaining to be the best behaviour to 
navigate politics - the continual struggle to legitimate different forms of collective 
action - in the Horn.118 Not because of an understanding of politics as a marketplace, 
as De Waal argues, but because bargaining is the most legitimate way to exercise 
power in countries which still have an operative primordial public and are dominated 
by the discursive tradition of Sunni Islam. Conceptualising legitimacy in this way has 
significant ramifications for those tasked with creating and maintaining political order 
in the Horn. This task requires reimagining what constitutes political order and the 
conventional methods currently being used in attempts to bring it about. 
                                               
115 Guess, Philosophy and Real Politics, 11. 
116 Wolff, In Defence of Anarchism, 1–5. 
117 Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
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I have given an explanatory critique of De Waal’s concept of the political marketplace. 
The results from this process along with other key concepts and scholar’s work were 
used to build my own explanation for why the dominant political behaviour in the 
Horn is bargaining. Although, there are many areas of disagreement between De Waal 
and I, the product of my critical engagement - my own explanation - undoubtedly 
builds on his work. In conclusion, I must acknowledge that I was initially convinced 
by De Waal’s analysis of Horn politics and the explanation of them that his political 
marketplace facilitated. I include this acknowledgement as I could not have reached 
the conclusions I have without De Waal’s work. The process of critically engaging 
with De Waal’s assumptions and concept have led me to the key authors and 
alternative explanations that have formed the basis of the understanding of legitimacy 
and political behaviour in the Horn presented here.  
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